THE GLOBAL LABOUR RESILIENCE INDEX 2026

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

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FOREWORD

By Sir Christopher A. Pissarides, Regius Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics, Whiteshield Special Advisor and Director, Global Labour Resilience Index Advisor and recipient of the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics

The forces shaping work today are pulling us in directions unlike anything we have known. For much of the past century, labour markets evolved under the steady influences of globalisation and technological progress. These forces largely reinforced each other, expanding trade, raising productivity, and supporting growth. Today, however, labour markets are being reshaped by two intertwined forces that do not always move in tandem: the fragmentation of world trade and the rapid rise of artificial intelligence. One is redrawing the geography of production; the other is redefining the nature of work itself.

The Global Labour Resilience Index (GLRI) 2026 captures this new reality. It examines how economies respond when global integration comes under strain and gives way to increasing fragmentation, and when technology advances more rapidly than institutions can adapt, generating uncertainty and anxiety among workers and firms. These forces test not only the flexibility of labour markets but also the foresight of policymakers and the preparedness of societies. The GLRI brings to light evidence about these pressures and provides insights that can help countries make better use of the tools already available while preparing for the deeper transformations ahead.

The results reveal a defining paradox. Countries have access to more tools, data, and technologies than at any point in history, yet the need for institutional agility has never been greater. The benefits of technological progress and global trade will not materialise automatically. They depend on how nations invest in people, in education and skills, and in systems of innovation. Resilience is no longer the ability to return to a previous normal after a shock. It is the capacity to shape a new normal in a world of continuous disruption. Being ready for this world is now a key measure of success.

Three lessons stand out.

First, diversification is the cornerstone of stability. Economies that rely on narrow export bases, concentrated supply chains, or uneven skills ecosystems are the most vulnerable when trade routes shift or technologies reorganise production.

Second, adaptability and forward-looking policies have become the true measure of competitiveness. The alignment of labour market policies, education systems, and innovation strategies will determine how quickly societies adjust and how widely the gains from new technologies are shared.

Third, transformation through innovation defines the new frontier of resilience. The integration of human and artificial intelligence will determine whether disruption leads to renewal or decline. Yet the GLRI shows that many economies still face a significant gap between absorptive capacity, which protects against shocks, and transformative capacity, which enables reinvention. Closing this gap is now central to long-term competitiveness.

These lessons are universal. They apply to advanced and emerging economies alike. The data reveal convergence, but unevenly. Some countries demonstrate strong technological readiness yet remain exposed to shifts in global trade. Others have diversified trade structures but face challenges in innovation diffusion and advanced skills development. A smaller group succeeds in combining technological strength with resilient and diversified interdependence. Finally, a number of economies continue to struggle on both fronts and face high exposure with limited adaptive capacity. These four profiles define the emerging global landscape of labour resilience.

Across regions, governments are investing in digital infrastructure, logistics networks, and education systems that connect workers to global opportunities. These efforts show that resilience can be built when countries provide strong protection for workers who may be displaced, ensure flexible pathways for firms and workers to adjust quickly, and promote broad inclusion through access to skills, opportunities, and innovation. Together, these elements strengthen an economy's capacity to absorb shocks, adapt to change, and create new sources of growth.

The broader message is one of responsibility and realism. Fragmentation is testing the openness that supported decades of growth, and it is neither balanced nor desirable. Yet with sound policies that strengthen resilience through diversification, innovation, investment in people, and institutional preparedness, countries can preserve many of the gains that globalisation has delivered. The economies that succeed will be those that maintain openness where possible while building the institutional strength needed to navigate a more uncertain global environment.

Building labour resilience is therefore not only an economic priority. It is a social contract. It means equipping workers to navigate change through strong people-centred policies that support skills, mobility, continuous learning, and fair opportunities, and ensuring that institutions protect security while enabling innovation. The challenge is not to resist disruption but to prepare people and societies to thrive within it.

The GLRI 2026 issues both a warning and a call to action. The warning is that technological acceleration and trade fragmentation are embedding new forms of fragility into the global economy. The call is to act with foresight and resolve. Resilience must now be designed into our systems through education, inclusion, diversification, and innovation, supported by institutional reforms that prepare economies for the scale and speed of disruption. The future will belong to those who can transform uncertainty into possibility.

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The GLRI Advisory Board was formed to provide guidance on the methodology and research applied to the Global Labour Resilience Index, ensure consistency of the findings and support in the dissemination of results. The Advisory Board is a select group of leading international practitioners and experts with unique knowledge and skills in the areas of economic and labour policy and technological disruption. Its members, while coming from diverse geographical and institutional backgrounds (international organisations, the public sector, non-governmental organisations, business, and academia), participate in their personal capacity. Whiteshield is grateful for the time and support provided by the Advisory Board members.

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The current edition builds on Whiteshield's proprietary Global Labour Resilience Index (GLRI) and Knowledge Mapping models and was developed and authored by a number of Whiteshield employees comprising Fadi Farra, Managing Partner and Director; Raed Safadi, Chief Economist & Partner; Elena Balter, Economic Modelling Lead, Isa Almusawi, Senior Associate.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Global Labour Resilience Index (GLRI) 2026 is released at a time when globalisation is undergoing a structural transformation. What was once an economic system defined by efficiency, openness, and predictable flows of goods, capital, and talent is now shaped by fragmentation, geopolitical competition, and strategic realignment. Supply chains are reorganising around security and resilience, and global trade patterns are becoming more regional and more politically aligned [1]. These shifts are enduring.

At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence are reshaping production systems, skills requirements, and employment models at a speed that rivals global trade realignment. Together, these forces reflect the emergence of a global economy where technological acceleration and trade realignment operate as continuous forces rather than transient shocks.

For labour markets, the central challenge is no longer how to recover from disruptions, but how to function in an environment where disruption itself is the norm.

The GLRI 2026 captures how countries' labour markets absorb, adapt, and transform in this new landscape. It evaluates long-term structural fundamentals as well as the agility of policies, institutions, skills systems, and the business and innovation environment in an era defined by rapid technological change and geopolitical uncertainty.

The GLRI 2026: Assessing Labour Resilience in an Age of Intelligent Transformation

Drawing on a decade of data and more than 70 validated indicators, the GLRI assesses labour resilience along two sub-indexes:

- Structural resilience examines long-term fundamentals such as macroeconomic stability, demographics, institutional quality, and exposure to global trade.
- Cyclical resilience measures the ability of labour markets to absorb shocks, adapt through innovation and mobility, and transform through new skills and the integration of emerging technologies, especially AI.

Within cyclical resilience, the **GLRI incorporates both traditional enablers** (education, labour policies, entrepreneurship, digital infrastructure) **and AI-related drivers of resilience** such as AI adoption by firms and workers, AI entrepreneurship, AI research and IP creation, and regulatory readiness.

Results of the GLRI 2026

The GLRI 2026 shows broad stability at the top of the rankings (Figure 1). The United States, Germany, and Singapore occupy the leading positions, with Germany rising into the top three since last year. This reflects the enduring strength of their innovation ecosystems, research depth, digital infrastructure, and institutional capacity for adaptability and long-term transformation.

Figure 1. Top 10 Countries' Rankings and Scores in the GLRI 2026



Source: Whiteshield

- **The United States remains the global leader** supported by strong adaptive and transformative capabilities derived from its innovation depth, firm-level digitalisation, and world-leading research ecosystem. However, absorptive capacity continues to weaken due to low labour-force participation and uneven adoption of AI tools across firms and regions. The United States is no longer the global leader in AI-specific resilience, having been overtaken by China and Korea, but it continues to set the benchmark for long-term technological transformation.

- **Germany rises to second place.** A deepening AI-related entrepreneurial ecosystem, increased AI investment, and advances in AI research and intellectual property strengthen Germany's adaptive and transformative capacity, while improved labour inclusiveness and confidence in future reinforce absorptive capacity. However, structural rigidities persist. Demographic decline, rising inequality, and slow institutional adaptation continue to hinder labour reallocation. Remaining challenges include stimulating entrepreneurship, accelerating innovation diffusion beyond leading industrial clusters, and addressing these structural frictions.

- **Singapore maintains a highly balanced profile** that combines innovation strength with regulatory clarity and effective long-term governance. Its adaptive and transformative capacities benefit from strong digital infrastructure, advanced AI capabilities, and extensive support for innovation and entrepreneurship and favourable business environment. Some declines in labour protection moderate its absorptive capacity, but Singapore continues to represent one of the world's most coherent models for integrating technology, skills, and institutional readiness.

The GLRI 2026 comparison with the 2025 edition shows clear shifts in countries' resilience performance. A group of **"winners," including the UAE, Korea, Morocco, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, move notably upward** due to stronger cybersecurity, faster AI adoption, improved digital skills, and higher labour participation.These advances

enhance their ability to absorb shocks, adapt to technological change, and diversify opportunities.

Overall, the changes highlight that in an era of rapid technological acceleration and growing geopolitical fragmentation, labour-market resilience is dynamic rather than assured. Countries that strengthen digital capabilities, institutions, and skills systems advance, while those that neglect these fundamentals fall progressively behind.

Regional and Inequality Patterns

The regional picture shows gradual signs of convergence. North America remains the most resilient region, followed by Europe and East Asia and the Pacific. South Asia moves ahead of Latin America, driven mainly by improvements in India and Bhutan, particularly in digital readiness, institutional stability, and the expansion of innovation ecosystems.

These patterns mirror shifts in global inequality. **AI initially widened resilience gaps** as early movers benefited from stronger digital infrastructure and deeper innovation ecosystems. But over the past two years, broader access to cloud-based AI tools, open-source models, and digital learning platforms **has begun to reduce disparities.** Many countries are now investing in digital skills, strengthening institutional trust, and expanding innovation systems. Convergence remains gradual and uneven, but the direction is clear.

These developments show that technological change is reshaping national resilience profiles and the opportunities available to workers, especially in economies rapidly improving their digital foundations.

How AI Is Reshaping Early-Career Labour Demand

Analysis of AI's impact on demand for young graduates, focusing on business and management graduates between 2022 and 2024, was conducted using the **Future of Work Navigator™** labour-demand database. The results **show a clear rebound in entry-level hiring**, driven primarily by strong momentum in East Asia. In contrast, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region records both the lowest demand level and the weakest growth across regions.

At the same time, the MENA region now has the highest share, more than 30 percent, of demand for business and management graduates among all entry-level graduates, followed by East Asia. Europe continues to show the most diversified recruitment patterns.

Demand for AI-building and AI-management skills among business graduates grew slightly in 2023 and then surged sharply in 2024 across all regions. In contrast, requirements for basic AI usage in job postings fell in 2024 compared to 2023. It demonstrates that across regions, the skills sought from early-career graduates are shifting in three notable ways:

1. **Normalization of AI use**. AI has become a standard feature of workplace practices and is therefore mentioned less explicitly in job descriptions.

2. **Rising expectations.** Employers increasingly look for graduates who can not only use AI tools, but also supervise, integrate, and contribute to the development of AI-enabled systems.

3. **Refinement of requirements.** Firms now prioritise strategic, ethical, and managerial capabilities related to AI adoption, moving beyond basic operational familiarity.

These developments illustrate a broader trend shaping labour resilience as captured in the GLRI 2026: **AI is not simply altering the tools that graduates use, it is redefining the capabilities that labour markets reward.** Economies that invest in advanced skills, continuous learning, and innovation ecosystems are better positioned to translate AI adoption into employment growth and productivity gains. This makes early-career skill formation a decisive factor in shaping long-term labour resilience in the AI era.

As labour markets adapt to these evolving skill requirements, an important question concerns the extent to which AI adoption can also translate into measurable productivity gains. Evidence shows that these gains differ markedly across technologies and adoption paths. Aghion and Bunel [2] estimate that effective AI adoption could raise annual productivity growth by about 0.7 percentage points, reflecting the potential of technology-driven augmentation. By contrast, Acemoglu's work on automation-biased AI suggests much smaller gains of around 0.07 percentage points when technology is deployed primarily to replace tasks rather than enhance them [3]. These contrasting findings show that productivity outcomes depend on policy choices that shape skills, organisational practices, and innovation capacity. These are the same capabilities that the GLRI assesses under labour-market readiness and adaptive resilience.

Labour Resilience Under Trade Fragmentation: A Stress Scenario

As a complement to the GLRI, **the 2026 edition introduces a Trade Fragmentation Stress Test that assesses how countries would perform under a scenario of abrupt disruption to global trade flows.** The stress test applies the same absorb–adapt–transform architecture used in the GLRI but redirects it toward trade-specific vulnerabilities. **It draws directly on the analytical foundations of Whiteshield's Global Trade Resilience Index™**, examining exposure to trade integration and policy distortions, the degree of market and partner concentration, dependence on critical imported inputs, and the efficiency of logistics and customs systems.

Although the same countries remain in the top tier (Figure 2), the scenario reveals **a markedly different set of pressures, leading to significant shifts** in their relative positions under stress:

- **Germany ranks first** in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test. Its ability to withstand trade-related disruptions reflects a broad export footprint, efficient cross-border infrastructure, and institutional arrangements that support continuity under stress. Although cyclical weakness and regulatory frictions currently dampen the pace of adjustment, these factors have not eroded the underlying capacity that enables Germany to manage and absorb trade shocks effectively.

- **The Netherlands ranks second,** supported by highly efficient logistics, advanced customs systems, and transparent regulatory frameworks. These strengths are moderated by vulnerabilities related to dependence on imported raw materials and significant employment exposure to trade-intensive sectors, which elevate its sensitivity to external disruptions.

- **Singapore ranks third**. Its digitalised border systems, predictable regulatory environment, and exceptional customs and logistics performance underpin high adaptive and transformative capacity. Nonetheless, significant share of employment linked to trade-related sectors and narrow base of trading partners increases exposure to disruptions in global supply chains.

- **The United States falls to 21st place on the trade-specific dimension, which lowers its overall ranking to sixth**. Persistent trade-policy volatility, rising import-concentration risks, and dependence on critical foreign inputs weaken its absorptive capacity. Its adaptive and transformative capabilities remain relatively stronger, supported by low labour exposure to trade shocks, an open services economy, and its position as a global innovation hub, but these strengths are not sufficient to offset its structural vulnerabilities to trade disruptions.

- **China maintains significant technological strength but shows vulnerabilities in the trade dimension, being ranked 26th**. Heavy reliance on imported intermediates, persistent trade distortions, and high employment exposure to trade-intensive sectors limit its ability to absorb and adjust to external shocks. These factors constrain overall resilience despite strong domestic capabilities.

Figure 2. Top 10 Countries' Rankings and Scores in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

Some countries, including the United States, **show a pronounced divergence between technological resilience and trade resilience.** The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test highlights a group of economies, such as Kuwait, Tunisia, the Philippines, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa that are better positioned to withstand trade shocks than AI-driven disruption. Their resilience to trade fragmentation reflects economic structures anchored in domestic demand, services, or diversified regional markets, trade liberalisation which limit exposure to global value-chain volatility. At the same time, gaps in digital infrastructure, innovation diffusion, including AI and AI-related skills continue to constrain their preparedness for technology-driven labour-market change.

In contrast, countries such as Lebanon, China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, and Korea demonstrate stronger readiness for AI-related transformation than for trade-related shocks. These economies benefit from more advanced AI-related digital capabilities, deeper pools of technical talent, or rapidly expanding AI ecosystems. However, they remain vulnerable to global trade disruptions due to concentrated trade profiles, dependence on critical imported inputs, adverse trade policies and structural exposure to geopolitical tensions and supply-chain bottlenecks. This imbalance illustrates how technological strength does not automatically translate into trade resilience, and how different development pathways can reinforce one dimension of resilience while leaving another exposed.

Trade Blocs Performance

The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test also shows that **resilience depends not only on national characteristics but on the ability of regional systems to manage shocks collectively.** Trade blocs influence resilience through shared markets, coordinated regulation, and production networks that either amplify or mitigate disruption.

Four blocs illustrate distinct models of resilience:

- **European Union: Diversified but Rigid.** The European Union exhibits strong absorptive and transformative capacity, underpinned by a large single market and robust labour and social institutions. These features provide stability and protection during shocks, but adaptability can be slower due to regulatory rigidity and complex decision-making processes. High exposure to external trade further amplifies sensitivity to global disruptions, particularly when adjustment in rules or institutions lags rapid external change.

- **The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA): Deep Markets, Limited Flexibility**. Deep regional integration and relatively flexible labour and product markets continue to underpin strong logistics and customs performance, enabling rapid adjustment during shocks. However, recent policy developments in the United States, including heightened use of trade enforcement tools, expanded industrial policy interventions, and greater uncertainty around future trade commitments, have introduced new sources of friction within the bloc. While these measures aim to strengthen domestic resilience, they also reinforce the bloc's heavy reliance on intra-regional trade and its sensitivity to U.S. economic cycles. As a result, absorptive capacity remains the weakest among major trade blocs, with downturns or policy shifts in the United States continuing to transmit disproportionately across the region.

- **The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): Balanced but Exposed.** RCEP displays a relatively balanced resilience profile across absorptive, adaptive, and transformative dimensions. Its strengths lie in scale and diversification across member economies, but vulnerabilities persist. Limited export diversification in several members, more modest participation in deeper forms of global integration, and only moderate customs and logistics performance constrain the bloc's responsiveness to large or sudden disruptions. Resilience is therefore steady but less dynamic under severe shocks.

- **The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Adaptive and Stable.** The GCC demonstrates the strongest adaptive capacity globally, supported by low trade-distortion policies and limited labour exposure in trade-intensive sectors. This allows rapid adjustment to changing external conditions. At the same time, dependence on imported critical inputs and modest export diversification remain key challenges, particularly under prolonged global supply-chain disruptions or sustained geopolitical stress.

Patterns of Resilience to Trade Shocks

Large trading economies often enjoy more diversified supply chains and broader export portfolios, which can cushion employment during global demand swings. Yet high **trade volume does not automatically translate into strong absorptive capacity.** Several major traders, including the United States, still struggle to absorb external shocks because of concentrated input dependencies and policy volatility.

Adaptive capacity also shows no clear correlation with trade scale. **Smaller and service-oriented economies,** such as those in the GCC, **often adjust more quickly to disruptions**. This reflects the importance of economic structure, labour-market composition, and agile policymaking rather than the size of the economy.

High employment exposure to trade, which lowers adaptive capacity, **is closely linked to export dependence**. Employment becomes more fragile when a large share of the workforce is tied to a narrow set of external markets, regardless of the total volume of trade.

High trade volumes can coexist with trade-distorting measures. This shows that **trade activity alone does not indicate openness**. The depth, quality, and enforcement of trade agreements, rather than their number, are the factors that determine an economy's ability to withstand shocks.

For advanced exporters, **resilience is defined by efficiency rather than self-sufficiency**. Although they depend on imported critical materials, those that convert inputs into high-value and technologically sophisticated outputs create a durable competitive advantage and a stronger foundation for long-term resilience.

Resilience Performers Towards AI versus Trade Disruption

Some countries show a clear mismatch between their strengths in AI resilience and their ability to withstand trade shocks. Economies such as China, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Brazil, India, Korea, and the United States are better prepared for AI transformation than for trade shocks, benefiting from strong digital ecosystems but

remaining exposed to concentrated trade profiles, geopolitical tensions, and supply-chain risks. In contrast, countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Tunisia, the Philippines, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa are more resilient to trade disruption than to AI-driven change, reflecting diversified or service-oriented structures but weaker digital and AI capabilities. This divergence shows that technological strength does not automatically ensure trade resilience, and that countries may excel in one dimension while remaining vulnerable in the other.

Figure 3. Rank difference between GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test and GLRI 2026 for the Selected countries



Source: Whiteshield

Redefining Labour Resilience in an Era of AI Transformation and Fragmentation

GLRI 2026 confirms that labour markets are being reshaped simultaneously by rapid AI-driven technological change and by deepening global fragmentation. AI is accelerating task reallocation, altering skill demand, and reshaping firm organisation. At the same time, trade is becoming more regionalised, technology diffusion more uneven, and geopolitical risk increasingly embedded in economic decision-making. In this environment, labour resilience can no longer be defined as the ability to restore pre-shock employment patterns. It must instead be treated as a core policy capability that enables economies to operate, adjust, and transform under permanent uncertainty.

The evidence from GLRI 2026 leads to a clear conclusion: labour resilience is not the by-product of growth, innovation, or digital adoption alone. It is the outcome of deliberate policy alignment. Economies that perform well do so by coordinating labour-market institutions, skills systems, technology diffusion, and macro-trade frameworks. Where these elements evolve in isolation, resilience gains are partial, uneven, and vulnerable to reversal.

This evidence translates into three priority policy actions.

First, **design diversification into labour and skills systems.** Exposure to technological and trade shocks is amplified when labour markets rely on narrow export bases, concentrated skill profiles, or single-sector employment structures. Governments should invest in transferable skills, promote cross-sector labour mobility, and support firms in redeploying and reskilling workers as demand shifts. Diversification should be treated as a labour-market objective alongside trade and industrial policy, rather than as a residual outcome of growth.

Second, **build institutional agility as core economic infrastructure**. Labour-market resilience depends less on the level of regulation than on the capacity of institutions to coordinate, adapt, and act quickly under stress. Policy priorities include scaling active labour-market programmes that accelerate reallocation, redesigning social protection systems to support transitions rather than job preservation, and strengthening coordination among employers, education providers, and public agencies. Flexibility must be embedded in governance, funding, and delivery mechanisms, not pursued through deregulation alone.

Third, **govern AI and digital diffusion as managed labour-market transitions.** Advances in AI and digital capacity do not automatically translate into resilience. Where technology adoption outpaces skills development and worker transition mechanisms, labour-market polarisation intensifies. Resilient systems align technology diffusion with skills anticipation, lifelong learning, and targeted support for displaced workers, treating AI as a structural adjustment challenge rather than a purely productivity-enhancing force.

GLRI 2026 also underscores that labour resilience is **multi-dimensional and context-specific.** Strength in AI readiness does not guarantee resilience to trade fragmentation, just as trade diversification does not ensure readiness for technological disruption. This disconnect reinforces the need for explicit stress-testing and complementary policy design rather than reliance on single reform narratives or technological optimism.

Taken together, these findings call for a shift in policy mindset. Labour resilience should be treated as **economic infrastructure,** comparable in importance to financial stability or energy security. It requires sustained investment, cross-ministerial coordination, and forward-looking governance rather than reactive intervention.

In the next phase of globalisation, competitive advantage will accrue to economies that can **continuously reallocate talent, diffuse technology without exclusion, and absorb external shocks without eroding social cohesion.** Those that succeed will not simply withstand disruption. They will shape new production patterns, attract higher-quality investment, and anchor long-term growth in adaptive and inclusive labour markets.

The remainder of the report is structured as follows. The next section outlines the GLRI framework and the complementary Trade Fragmentation Stress Test. Chapter 1 examines labour market resilience to shock with the focus on AI-driven transformation, while Chapter 2 assesses exposure and adjustment capacity under trade fragmentation. Together, these perspectives show how the global map of labour resilience is increasingly defined by policy coherence, institutional agility, and the capacity to turn uncertainty into sustained renewal.



THE GLRI FRAMEWORK

The GLRI 2026 updates how labour-market resilience is assessed in light of two powerful forces shaping today's global economy. Artificial intelligence has become a permanent feature of production and employment and is no longer a temporary or speculative trend. It must therefore be incorporated into the way resilience is measured. At the same time, global trade is becoming more fragmented, with supply-chain reorganisation, market access pressures and geopolitical tensions creating external shocks that differ from those associated with technological change [4].

The GLRI represents the traditional and established approach to measuring labour-market resilience. It remains grounded in its core architecture, which evaluates how economies absorb shocks, adapt to new pressures and transform toward long-term opportunities. Since the 2025 edition, this architecture is updated to reflect the role of artificial intelligence by integrating AI-related indicators into the GLRI structure [5]. Intelligent technologies now shape the speed, depth and direction of labour-market adjustment and therefore must be embedded directly into the way agility and transformation are measured.

The GLRI: Structural and Cyclical Resilience in the Age of AI

The GLRI is structured around two sub-indices, Structural Resilience and Cyclical Resilience, as presented in Figure 4. These capture the long-term foundations of labour markets and their short- and medium-term capacity to absorb, adapt and transform in response to disruption.

Artificial intelligence is reshaping work, skills and employment structures at a pace that is now embedded in day-to-day labour-market functioning. In the GLRI 2026, AI-related indicators are incorporated into the Cyclical Resilience sub-index, where they measure how effectively countries manage technological disruptions, adjust their labour-market institutions and prepare for long-term transformation. This maintains continuity with the traditional GLRI framework while recognising that intelligent technologies are now central to labour-market agility and adaptability.

Figure 4. GLRI Framework: Integrating Human and Artificial Intelligence in Labour Resilience



Source: Whiteshield

Structural Sub-index captures the long-term fundamentals that shape a country's underlying capacity to withstand disruption. These include macroeconomic stability, demographic structure, institutional quality, economic maturity, exposure to and composition of global trade. These elements evolve gradually and form the baseline conditions under which labour markets operate.

Cyclical Sub-index measures how rapidly and effectively labour markets adjust to short- and medium-term pressures. It follows the absorb, adapt and transform sequence illustrated in Figure 5:

- **Absorptive capacity** defined as the ability to contain the shock and minimise the damage on jobs and workers.
- **Adaptive capacity** defined as the ability to recover quickly and rapidly creating new jobs to replace the destroyed ones.
- **Transformative capacity** defined as the ability to align with major future trends and turn long-term stressors into opportunities.

Figure 5. Framework for Cyclical Resilience



Source: Whiteshield

Within the cyclical pillar, two complementary dimensions are assessed:

- **AI Dimension** focuses exclusively on AI-specific factors, including AI adoption by firms and workers, AI-related entrepreneurship and employment, AI R&D, intellectual-property creation, and the regulatory and ethical environment for AI.
- **Traditional Dimension** covers broader enablers of resilience, including labour-market policies, participation rates, education and skills, business environment, and ICT infrastructure and innovation.

Why AI belongs in the Cyclical Resilience sub-index? AI is now a permanent element of economic activity, but its effects on labour markets occur through mechanisms that are cyclical rather than structural. These mechanisms include rapid shifts in occupational and task composition, firm-level productivity adjustments, changing skill demands and the need for re-skilling, and movement between sectors and regions. These dynamics directly influence the absorb, adapt and transform stages. AI does not form a slow-moving structural fundamental such as demographics or institutional depth. Its placement in the Cyclical Resilience sub-index therefore reflects the way technological change is transmitted through labour systems.

Trade Fragmentation Stress Test: A Scenario of Trade Disruption

The 2026 edition introduces a Trade Fragmentation Stress Test that examines how labour markets would perform if global trade flows were disrupted. This scenario does not constitute an alternative ranking. Instead, it applies the same Structural and Cyclical Resilience architecture used in the GLRI to assess how resilience patterns shift when the source of disruption changes from technological transformation to trade-related pressures (Figure 6).

Figure 6. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Framework: Labour Resilience Under Trade Disruption



Source: Whiteshield

The scenario draws on the analytical foundations of **Whiteshield's Global Trade Resilience Index™**, with the AI dimension replaced by the trade dimension. Within this dimension, it evaluates how economies respond across the three stages of resilience:

- **Absorptive capacity** reflects the extent to which labour markets can limit the immediate impact of a trade shock. It examines exposure to concentrated export and import markets, reliance on critical imported intermediates and raw materials, and external and internal conflict risk probability. Economies with diversified partners, broader supply bases and lower risks of conflicts experience smaller and more contained labour-market disruptions when trade flows are interrupted.

- **Adaptive capacity** reflects the ability of firms and workers to adjust to a reconfigured trading environment. It considers trade-related policies and protectionism, and dependence of employment on trade. Open economies not restricted by trade distorting policies and lower dependence of employment on trade can quickly adapt to the trade shocks.

- **Transformative capacity** captures the long-term ability of an economy to reposition itself under persistent fragmentation. It evaluates the level of trade integration, and infrastructure, logistics and customs efficiency. Economies with efficient infrastructure and logistics networks and transparent customs rules can reorient trade patterns and redeploy labour more effectively following external shocks.

The scenario reveals how resilience changes under external trade shocks and highlights vulnerabilities that are not visible when assessing technological disruption alone.

A Unified Framework for Understanding Labour Resilience

Together, the traditional GLRI and the Trade Fragmentation Stress Test shift the focus from a static view of resilience to a dynamic understanding of how economies evolve under pressure. They demonstrate that resilience is not simply the capacity to return to a previous equilibrium. Instead, it is the ability to create a new and stronger one as technological change accelerates and global trade becomes more fragmented.

The GLRI captures how economies adjust to continuous technological transformation. It highlights the capabilities that allow countries to absorb disruption, reallocate workers and firms, and build long-term advantages through innovation, skills development and institutional agility.

The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test complements this picture by showing how resilience patterns change when shocks originate outside the technological domain. It reveals the specific vulnerabilities associated with concentrated trade structures, dependence on critical inputs and exposure to volatility in global markets, while also highlighting the systems that enable countries to redirect trade, reconfigure production and redeploy labour in the face of external stress.

Viewed together, the two perspectives reinforce three overarching insights.

1. **Resilience is dynamic and path-shaping**. Economies do not merely withstand shocks; they evolve through them, and often gain strength when supported by strong institutions, diversified structures and forward-looking skills systems.

2. **Different shocks reveal different capabilities**. Strength in managing AI-driven change does not always translate into strength under trade fragmentation, and the reverse is also true. Resilience therefore depends on broad-based capabilities that operate across multiple domains.

3. **Resilience is now a strategic asset**. Countries that consistently invest in absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacity are better positioned to shape new patterns of production, attract investment and capture emerging opportunities in a more uncertain global environment.

This unified framework confirms that labour-market resilience is not a defensive posture. It is an active process of renewal that enables economies to navigate uncertainty and emerge stronger as the global economy is reshaped by technological acceleration and shifting trade realities.



CHAPTER 1:
GLRI 2026 - THE RESULTS

Table 1. GLRI 2026 Results by Sub-Index and Dimension

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)
USA	1	77.23	4	81.25	2	75.22	4	73.45	3	78.77
Germany	2	75.63	5	81.22	4	72.84	8	71.15	5	76.22
Singapore	3	75.52	17	76.21	3	75.17	3	74.27	4	76.96
Korea	4	75.45	24	73.83	1	76.25	2	74.42	1	79.91
UK	5	74.39	10	78.55	5	72.31	1	74.49	8	67.96
Sweden	6	73.47	9	80.74	8	69.83	6	72.77	11	63.97
Finland	7	72.33	14	76.98	7	70.01	11	69.76	6	70.51
Netherlands	8	72.28	1	85.86	14	65.49	12	69.32	18	57.83
Switzerland	9	71.32	20	74.78	9	69.60	5	72.93	12	62.94
Denmark	10	71.24	2	85.06	17	64.33	16	66.70	17	59.58
Canada	11	71.08	15	76.68	11	68.28	14	68.62	10	67.59
Luxembourg	12	70.64	7	80.84	13	65.54	22	64.26	7	68.09
France	13	69.96	8	80.82	16	64.53	18	66.18	15	61.25
Israel	14	69.79	28	72.23	10	68.57	7	71.55	14	62.61
China	15	69.69	40	66.81	6	71.14	15	67.07	2	79.26
Japan	16	67.69	25	73.33	15	64.86	24	63.36	9	67.87
Austria	17	67.12	3	83.03	24	59.17	23	63.99	25	49.52
Belgium	18	66.82	6	81.19	22	59.64	19	65.88	30	47.15
Australia	19	66.65	42	66.38	12	66.79	10	69.89	16	60.58
Estonia	20	65.51	18	76.18	20	60.18	20	64.89	23	50.75
New Zealand	21	64.38	26	73.32	21	59.91	13	68.92	36	41.91
Iceland	22	63.47	45	65.26	18	62.57	9	70.87	31	45.96
Norway	23	63.36	38	67.31	19	61.38	17	66.53	22	51.09
Spain	24	63.22	12	78.03	26	55.82	31	55.93	19	55.61
Ireland	25	62.93	32	69.85	23	59.47	21	64.28	24	49.86
UAE	26	62.74	29	72.09	25	58.06	33	55.75	13	62.68
Czechia	27	62.27	13	77.51	27	54.66	25	60.58	33	42.80
Italy	28	61.40	16	76.33	28	53.94	40	54.16	20	53.51
Portugal	29	61.13	19	76.01	29	53.70	27	58.01	32	45.06
Poland	30	59.20	11	78.49	36	49.56	29	56.33	44	36.03
Slovenia	31	59.15	31	70.46	30	53.50	30	55.99	27	48.52
Lithuania	32	57.78	21	74.76	37	49.29	32	55.89	43	36.09
Cyprus	33	56.31	50	64.40	32	52.27	34	54.75	29	47.33
Hungary	34	55.91	33	69.47	38	49.12	38	54.21	39	38.95
Malaysia	35	55.84	43	66.21	33	50.65	28	57.52	42	36.91
Slovakia	36	54.93	35	68.88	40	47.96	37	54.26	45	35.36
Latvia	37	54.82	27	72.74	43	45.87	39	54.21	67	29.18
Malta	38	54.39	56	62.03	34	50.57	35	54.64	35	42.42
India	39	54.19	23	73.94	47	44.32	73	41.94	26	49.08

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)
Thailand	40	53.40	34	69.16	44	45.52	41	51.89	56	32.80
Romania	41	53.01	22	74.24	52	42.39	49	48.59	64	30.00
Qatar	42	52.51	75	57.00	35	50.27	43	51.19	28	48.44
Croatia	43	52.45	30	71.31	49	43.01	42	51.43	83	26.19
Bahrain	44	52.08	95	51.13	31	52.56	26	58.31	37	41.08
Bulgaria	45	51.46	37	68.04	48	43.16	45	49.51	62	30.46
Saudi Arabia	46	50.98	82	54.69	39	49.12	55	47.04	21	53.28
Vietnam	47	50.32	58	61.44	46	44.76	44	50.26	51	33.78
Turkey	48	49.74	36	68.73	58	40.25	66	43.55	53	33.65
Greece	49	48.69	49	64.66	57	40.71	62	44.93	57	32.27
Uruguay	50	48.45	59	61.41	54	41.98	60	45.80	46	34.33
Russia	51	48.40	104	50.07	41	47.56	36	54.28	49	34.13
Serbia	52	48.16	47	64.84	61	39.82	51	47.94	90	23.60
Mexico	53	47.80	44	65.61	65	38.90	68	43.23	63	30.22
Jordan	54	47.67	48	64.81	62	39.10	74	41.62	50	34.05
Mauritius	55	47.65	46	65.10	64	38.93	65	43.63	65	29.51
Oman	56	47.61	102	50.29	42	46.27	46	49.45	38	39.92
Brazil	57	47.53	74	57.04	50	42.77	54	47.07	48	34.18
Chile	58	47.43	68	57.72	53	42.29	52	47.86	58	31.13
Indonesia	59	47.24	39	67.02	70	37.35	72	42.19	76	27.65
Barbados	60	46.92	67	58.00	55	41.37	48	48.75	82	26.61
Brunei	61	46.89	96	50.87	45	44.90	58	46.08	34	42.55
Montenegro	62	46.80	80	55.39	51	42.51	56	46.87	52	33.78
Philippines	63	46.71	52	63.65	67	38.23	59	46.06	95	22.58
Georgia	64	46.66	63	59.91	60	40.03	57	46.62	80	26.86
Costa Rica	65	46.31	53	62.65	68	38.14	69	42.46	66	29.50
Belarus	66	44.79	69	57.68	66	38.34	47	49.42	109	16.19
Moldova	67	44.69	62	60.62	76	36.73	53	47.29	111	15.60
Morocco	68	44.57	65	59.28	71	37.21	64	43.69	86	24.25
Ukraine	69	44.20	84	54.48	63	39.06	63	44.30	69	28.58
Kazakhstan	70	44.09	92	51.86	59	40.21	50	48.57	91	23.51
Armenia	71	43.89	72	57.26	72	37.20	71	42.24	78	27.12
Uzbekistan	72	43.78	70	57.58	74	36.88	85	39.80	60	31.03
South Africa	73	43.77	61	60.86	80	35.22	80	40.87	88	23.93
North Macedonia	74	43.75	66	58.58	77	36.33	67	43.45	97	22.08
Tunisia	75	43.54	51	63.76	89	33.43	88	37.08	84	26.14
Colombia	76	43.48	76	56.75	75	36.84	75	41.40	75	27.73
Egypt	77	43.24	41	66.49	94	31.61	92	35.50	89	23.83
Argentina	78	42.70	85	54.19	73	36.96	79	40.92	68	29.03
Kyrgyzstan	79	42.58	79	55.97	78	35.88	70	42.27	93	23.08
Kuwait	80	42.52	90	52.40	69	37.58	78	40.97	61	30.80
Kenya	81	42.21	57	61.89	92	32.37	87	37.91	99	21.27

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)
Bhutan	82	41.48	78	56.12	84	34.17	97	34.14	47	34.22
Peru	83	41.36	81	55.17	82	34.46	76	41.30	101	20.78
Azerbaijan	84	41.19	113	41.92	56	40.83	61	45.71	59	31.06
Lebanon	85	40.84	93	51.70	79	35.40	98	34.06	40	38.08
Senegal	86	40.48	64	59.58	95	30.93	101	33.63	85	25.54
Ecuador	87	40.09	100	50.41	81	34.92	82	40.65	92	23.48
Benin	88	39.86	91	52.10	87	33.74	89	36.74	74	27.74
Dominica Republic	89	39.83	54	62.26	103	28.62	96	34.21	107	17.44
Namibia	90	39.44	101	50.37	86	33.98	103	32.14	41	37.66
Rwanda	91	39.35	97	50.84	88	33.61	99	33.71	55	33.42
Sri Lanka	92	39.34	73	57.05	97	30.49	94	34.76	98	21.95
Panama	93	38.99	94	51.20	91	32.88	86	39.33	103	19.98
Mongolia	94	38.91	98	50.76	90	32.98	83	40.45	106	18.04
Pakistan	95	38.87	71	57.54	100	29.53	106	30.40	73	27.80
B&H	96	38.42	77	56.35	101	29.45	93	34.87	105	18.62
Bangladesh	97	38.36	99	50.47	93	32.31	95	34.40	71	28.12
Ghana	98	38.26	110	46.52	85	34.14	81	40.67	100	21.08
Guatemala	99	37.79	55	62.25	112	25.56	114	26.34	87	23.99
Algeria	100	37.68	112	44.63	83	34.21	77	41.20	102	20.25
El Salvador	101	37.49	60	60.98	109	25.75	105	30.57	110	16.10
Myanmar	102	36.92	88	52.81	102	28.97	108	29.28	70	28.36
Iran	103	36.57	106	48.07	96	30.82	102	32.85	81	26.75
Paraguay	104	36.55	87	53.49	105	28.08	91	35.87	114	12.51
Togo	105	36.54	83	54.57	106	27.52	111	27.78	79	27.01
Trinidad & Tobago	106	36.46	105	48.56	98	30.41	84	40.12	117	11.00
Bolivia	107	35.48	103	50.26	104	28.09	90	36.11	116	12.04
Uganda	108	34.70	89	52.77	110	25.67	109	29.08	104	18.83
Ethiopia	109	32.70	108	46.80	111	25.65	104	31.54	113	13.87
Nigeria	110	32.23	116	36.76	99	29.97	100	33.66	94	22.60
Honduras	111	32.19	86	53.59	117	21.49	112	26.80	118	10.87
Madagascar	112	31.19	107	47.40	115	23.08	110	28.46	115	12.32
Burundi	113	30.25	115	37.25	107	26.75	113	26.56	77	27.14
Mali	114	29.51	117	35.84	108	26.34	118	22.72	54	33.58
Tajikistan	115	29.34	111	44.63	116	21.70	115	24.01	108	17.06
Mauritania	116	26.53	109	46.65	120	16.47	116	23.26	120	2.87
Iraq	117	26.46	118	32.15	114	23.61	119	21.46	72	27.92
Burkina Faso	118	25.55	114	39.99	119	18.33	117	23.16	119	8.65
Venezuela	119	24.16	120	22.47	113	25.01	107	30.14	112	14.74
Congo	120	22.63	119	29.46	118	19.22	120	17.72	96	22.22

Source: Whiteshield

Top 10 Countries

The 2026 Labour Resilience Ranking toward AI disruption is led by the United States, Germany, and Singapore. Eight of the top ten countries are from Europe, joined by Singapore and Korea from East Asia. This confirms the continued dominance of advanced, innovation-driven economies in AI readiness and labour adaptability (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Top 10 Countries' Rankings and Scores in GLRI 2026



Source: Whiteshield

The composition of the top performers remains broadly stable compared with last year. Denmark enters the top ten while Canada drops out (Figure 8).

The United States is no longer the global leader in AI resilience. While it retains first place in the overall GLRI, it falls to third in the AI-specific dimension, overtaken by China and Korea. Both countries advanced more rapidly in firm-level AI adoption and narrowed the gaps in AI research and intellectual property development. The United States is also experiencing a decline in absorptive capacity. Rankings in traditional absorptive capacity fell from 16th to 19th, and in AI absorptive capacity from 19th to 25th, reflecting slowing labour-market participation, limited diffusion of AI tools among workers, and weakening social protection indicators.

Germany made an advance from fifth to second place, driven by broad-based improvements across most of AI resilience and traditional pillars. Increases in education and training and AI entrepreneurship and investments improved its adaptive capacity while gains in social inclusiveness and confidence in the future strengthened its traditional absorptive capacity.

Singapore maintains its top-three position due to the sustained strength of its business, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystem.

Korea records the most significant upward movement, supported by improvements across structural and cyclical pillars and accelerated firm-level AI adoption and cybersecurity. This reflects effective national alignment between policy, technology diffusion, and labour-market adaptation [10].

Figure 8. Top 10 Countries' in GLRI 2025 versus GLRI 2026



Source: Whiteshield

Over the period 2019–2026, **countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands strengthened their labour-market resilience primarily through a structural adjustment path**, anchored in macroeconomic and trade stability, relatively low inequality, and sustained investment in high-trust institutions and social partnership frameworks (Figure 8).

By contrast, economies including **Algeria, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United States advanced largely through policy-led or cyclical channels,** relying on active labour-market interventions, improvements in the business environment, and targeted investments in education, skills, and innovation. Within this group, the United States and China stand out for rapid gains in recent years, reflecting accelerated AI diffusion and digital transformation. The United Kingdom and Italy follow a more hybrid trajectory, combining gradual structural strengthening with shorter-term, policy-driven adjustments (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Changes in Countries' Labour Resilience, 2019–2026



Source: Whiteshield

1: United States Of America: Top Resilient, Loosing AI Resilience Leadership

The United States ranks among the global top five in both structural and cyclical drivers of labour resilience. It performs strongly in traditional resilience, which includes labour protection, education, entrepreneurship, and innovation, and remains a global leader in AI resilience, although it has been overtaken by China and Korea (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Overview of the US Rankings in GLRI 2026, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield

Structural Resilience

Structural resilience remains broadly stable. The United States retains top-ten rankings in the level of economic development and its macroeconomic stability, but high and increasing inequality weighs on its performance, placing it 24th on the corresponding pillar. Declines in statistical capacity (from 4th to 12th) and governance quality (from 21st to 25th) further weaken its institutional foundations. Demographics remain a persistent structural challenge, with the country ranking 86th. Product diversification and trade vulnerability remain moderate and broadly unchanged.

Cyclical Resilience

The greatest weakness lies in absorptive capacity. Traditional absorptive capacity fell from 16th to 19th, driven by declining labour participation (from 55th to 60th) and youth participation (from 25th to 33rd). AI absorptive capacity dropped from 19th to 25th due to slow diffusion of AI tools among workers [6, 7, 8]. Labour-policy efficiency remains moderate.

By contrast, the United States excels in both adaptive and transformative capacities. It ranks first globally in AI adaptive capacity, supported by advanced AI regulation, entrepreneurship, and investment ecosystems. It rises to second place in traditional adaptive capacity due to its dynamic business environment and developed gig and sharing economies. Digital skills (22nd) and education and training systems (18th) remain moderate but show improvement.

The United States leads the world in AI-driven transformative capacity. It ranks first in AI equipment, R&D, research output, and intellectual property generation, and second in AI strategies. Traditional transformative performance remains strong, supported by a top-five position in research and IP, although cybersecurity and general innovation linkages remain slightly behind other high performers.

2: Germany: Social and AI-Driven Resilience

Figure 11. Overview of Germany Rankings in GLRI 2026, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield

Germany rises to second place in the GLRI 2026, marking an improvement across most of Germany rises to second place in the GLRI 2026, reflecting improvements across most pillars relative to 2025 (Figure 11).

Structural Resilience

Foundational factors remain stable. Germany maintains a highly diversified production structure, ranks in the global top three for macroeconomic stability, and remains within the top ten for economic development. Structural challenges persist, including an ageing population, rising relative inequality relative to peers, and institutional performance.

Cyclical Resilience

Germany ranks among the global top five in absorptive capacity in both traditional and AI dimensions. Improvements in social inclusiveness and rising confidence in the future strengthened traditional absorptive capacity, although labour participation declined and became low. On the AI side, firm-level adoption weakened marginally relative to advanced peers.

Adaptive capacity strengthened across both dimensions. Germany ranks 20th in the traditional adaptive pillar due to lower entrepreneurial intensity, but rises to fourth in

AI adaptive capacity, supported by growing AI-driven entrepreneurship. Improvements in education and training further reinforce adaptability.

Transformative capacity remains a consistent strength. Germany ranks in the global top ten in both traditional and AI transformative capacity, supported by world-class R&D systems, research output, and intellectual property generation. Cybersecurity and digital requirements show slight deterioration, indicating areas where renewed investment could enhance long-term transformation.

3: Singapore: Stable and Balanced

Figure 12. Overview of Singapore Rankings in GLRI 2026, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield

Singapore demonstrates a consistently balanced performance across all dimensions of labour resilience, remaining broadly stable compared with last year, with some weakening in cyclical dimensions (Figure 12).

Structural Resilience

Singapore remains among the global leaders in economic development and macroeconomic stability. The absence of inequality data remains the main gap in the dataset. Key vulnerabilities include high trade exposure and limited product diversification. Demographic trends and statistical capacity also present challenges. Governance remains strong but has declined slightly relative to peers.

Cyclical Resilience

Absorptive capacity weakens in both traditional and AI dimensions due to declines in labour protection and social inclusiveness. Confidence in the future remains strong, and labour-policy efficiency remains within the top ten. AI absorptive performance remains relatively stable, with a minor decline in firm-level AI adoption relative to other leaders. Meanwhile, a striking 77% of the workforce is employed in roles with

substantial potential for AI adoption. Importantly, around half of these workers are in occupations with high AI complementarity, cutting across management, scientific and engineering fields, healthcare, legal professions, and education. This broad concentration of AI-complementary roles signals strong technological readiness, creating significant opportunities for productivity gains and efficiency improvements across the economy [9].

Adaptive capacity remains solid in the AI dimension but weaker in traditional areas. Singapore continues to be one of leaders in AI penetration, entrepreneurship, and investment. However, deterioration in digital skills reduces traditional adaptive performance.

Transformative capacity is one of Singapore's strongest pillars. Both AI and traditional transformation remain stable, supported by world-leading AI equipment and infrastructure and modest improvements in cybersecurity. Singapore maintains its status as a global benchmark for innovation-driven transformation.

Regional Resilience

Regional performance remains broadly stable. North America continues to lead, followed by Europe and East Asia and the Pacific. **The only major shift is the rise of South Asia above Latin America**, driven by improvements in India and Bhutan. India advances from 42nd to 39th through broad-based gains in structural and cyclical resilience, including reduced inequality and improved cybersecurity. Bhutan rises from 91st to 82nd, driven primarily by gains in AI research and intellectual property (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Regional GLRI 2026 Ranking and Average Scores



Source: Whiteshield

Structurally, North America, Europe, and East Asia remain the top three regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, and South Asia leading only in demographics due to younger populations.

Figure 14. Regional GLRI 2026 Average Scores by Pillar and Selected Topics



Source: Whiteshield

Cyclically, **North America leads across all traditional pillars**. Europe ranks second overall but is overtaken by East Asia in Research and IP. MENA advances to third place in digital skills due to recent policy efforts (Figure 14).

In the AI dimension, North America leads across nearly all topics, except workers' adoption of AI, where East Asia excels. Europe remains consistently second, although East Asia surpasses it in AI Research and IP.

Overall, regional patterns remain consistent, indicating stable global alignment in both traditional and AI-driven labour resilience.

Inequality Trap Evolution

GLRI 2025 showed that AI disruption initially widened global labour-resilience inequality [5], with the benefits concentrated among early technological leaders such as the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (Figure 15).

The 2026 results show a gradual narrowing of this gap. The variation in AI-dimension rankings has decreased, indicating that more countries are catching up in AI adoption, innovation, and integration. This convergence helps reduce inequality in overall labour resilience.

The AI landscape is becoming more distributed and competitive. The United States is no longer the singular global leader, giving way to rising powers such as China and Korea. Greater participation in AI development and diffusion is creating a more multipolar technological environment. This shift enhances stability by reducing global dependence on a single technological center.

Figure 15. Scores Dispersion of GLRI and Cyclical AI Dimension 2025-2026



Source: Whiteshield

Dynamic Analysis: From Reform to Results, Policy-Led Pathways to Improving Labour Resilience

The GLRI 2026 not only identifies economies with the highest levels of labour resilience but also highlights a distinct group of countries that have strengthened their resilience most visibly over time. This dynamic perspective underscores a central insight: resilience gains are neither automatic nor model-specific. Instead, they reflect deliberate policy choices, institutional coordination, and targeted technology adoption that reinforce countries' capacity to absorb shocks, adapt to disruption, and enable longer-term transformation.

A comparison between GLRI 2026 and GLRI 2025 rankings reveals a clear set of resilience "winners" and "losers," defined here as countries experiencing rank changes greater than four places (Figure 16). These shifts capture how effectively economies have enhanced, or failed to enhance, their absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities over the past year.

Thirteen countries register notable upward movement, including the United Arab Emirates, Korea, Morocco, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Their improvement trajectories confirm that resilience gains do not stem from a single policy lever or development pathway. Rather, they emerge from coordinated progress across skills systems, digital readiness, labour participation, and institutional effectiveness.

Figure 16. GLRI 2026 Ranks versus GLRI 2025 Ranks, Selected Countries with Biggest Changes



Source: Whiteshield
Note: Positive rank change, e.g., by 6, means rank improvement by 6. For example, Saudi Arabia improved its rank from 52th to 46th. Negative rank change, e.g. by -5, highlight the rank worsening (e.g., Chile from 53th to 58th)

The following case study boxes examine four countries that exemplify distinct, policy-led pathways to improving labour resilience in the current decade. Spanning different income levels and economic structures, they illustrate how targeted alignment of labour policy, skills development, and innovation can translate into measurable resilience gains.

BOX 1. UAE: Largest GLRI Improvements, 2026 vs. 2025

The United Arab Emirates records a clear upward trajectory in labour resilience in GLRI 2026, driven primarily by improvements in cyclical dimensions of resilience. GLRI analysis links this progress to advances in cybersecurity, AI adoption, digital skills, and the business environment, which together enhance the labour market's capacity to adjust to rapid technological change.

GLRI topics with biggest improvements in 2026 vs 2025 for UAE



These developments predominantly strengthen adaptive capacity by enabling faster reallocation of workers and firms toward emerging opportunities, while also supporting longer-term transformation through improved digital readiness. Structural characteristics related to demographics and trade exposure continue to shape baseline resilience, but recent gains underscore the role of coordinated policy action and technology diffusion in improving labour-market performance.

Policy lesson: Coordinated advances in digital security, skills, business environment, and AI adoption can deliver tangible labour-resilience gains within a relatively short policy horizon.

BOX 2. Saudi Arabia: Largest GLRI Improvements, 2026 vs. 2025

Saudi Arabia shows marked improvement in labour resilience in GLRI 2026, reflecting progress across a wide set of resilience parameters. Gains are evident in both long-term structural characteristics and policy-driven cyclical adjustments, with particularly strong advances in absorptive and adaptive capacity.

These improvements reflect rising labour participation, especially among youth, enhanced education and digital skills, greater workforce readiness for AI, and strengthened cybersecurity and R&D. Together, these factors improve the labour market's ability to adjust to ongoing economic transformation. Structural challenges related to macroeconomic stability, governance, and economic concentration persist, but sustained reform momentum and rising development levels are translating into measurable resilience gains.

GLRI Topics with Biggest Improvements in 2026 vs 2025 for Saudi Arabia



Policy lesson: Even in large and complex economies, sustained labour-market and skills reforms can strengthen resilience despite enduring structural constraints.

BOX 3. Morocco: Largest GLRI Improvements, 2026 vs. 2025

Morocco demonstrates a clear improvement path in labour resilience in GLRI 2026, illustrating how progress can be achieved in a developing-economy context. GLRI analysis attributes recent improvements to advances in digital skills, cybersecurity, AI adoption, education and training and cybersecurity, which together enhance the capacity to absorb shocks, adapt to technological change, and make transformation safe.

GLRI Topics with Biggest Improvements in 2026 vs 2025 for Morocco



Morocco's experience shows that labour resilience can improve meaningfully even in the absence of advanced technological ecosystems, provided that foundational institutional and digital capabilities are improved.

Policy lesson: Strengthening digital foundations and participation outcomes can deliver significant labour-resilience gains even before frontier technologies are widely deployed.

BOX 4. Korea: Largest GLRI Improvements, 2026 vs. 2025

Korea stands out in GLRI 2026 as one of the most dynamic improvers among top-ranked economies. Its performance is closely linked to accelerated firm-level AI adoption and strengthened cybersecurity, supported by sustained investment in digital and innovation capabilities, including AI-related R&D.

This technology-accelerated pathway delivers rapid resilience gains but also highlights the importance of addressing complementary vulnerabilities, particularly those linked to external exposure and trade dependence.

GLRI Topics with Biggest Improvements in 2026 vs 2025 for Korea



Policy lesson: AI-led resilience gains can be rapid and substantial, but they require parallel strengthening of trade resilience to reduce external vulnerabilities.

Across the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Korea, GLRI 2026 identifies a shared set of drivers underpinning resilience improvements: cybersecurity, AI adoption, digital skills, and labour participation. Korea represents the most concentrated, technology-accelerated pathway, while Saudi Arabia illustrates the broadest improvement across resilience dimensions.

Taken together, these cases reinforce a core GLRI insight: labour resilience strengthens most reliably when digital security, skills development, participation, and technology diffusion advance in a coordinated manner, and when trade-related vulnerabilities are addressed explicitly rather than implicitly assumed away.

By contrast, twenty countries experience significant declines in their resilience rankings, including the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Chile, Azerbaijan, Myanmar, and Venezuela. Their slippage reflects persistent institutional constraints, weaker diffusion of research, innovation and AI, declining firm-level AI adoption, and fragile cybersecurity. These patterns highlight how quickly resilience can erode when structural fundamentals weaken, diversification stalls, or policy uncertainty constrains adjustment in an increasingly fragmented global environment.

Labour-market resilience is therefore dynamic rather than assured. Evidence from GLRI 2026 shows that, amid rapid technological acceleration and rising geopolitical fragmentation, countries that reinforce core resilience fundamentals through coherent policy action continue to advance, while those that neglect them fall progressively behind.



Analysis of AI's Impact on Demand for Young Business & Management Graduates

The rapid diffusion of artificial intelligence is transforming labour markets, altering both the quantity and the quality of available jobs. This section focuses on one key dimension of that transformation: **how AI adoption is changing demand for young graduates in business and management**. As AI systems become embedded across industries, do firms still seek young managers in the same numbers, and with the same skill profiles as before?

The analysis explores three aspects of this question. First, it examines whether the share of demand for graduates has shifted during the generative-AI diffusion phase (2022–2024) relative to other fields. Second, it investigates the demand changes for business and management graduates. Third, it assesses whether employers' expectations have evolved, and in particular whether they now prioritise graduates who can use, develop, or oversee AI-enabled systems.

The study draws on Whiteshield **Future of Work Navigator™** database of job postings (2022–2024) across selected countries in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), and East Asia & Pacific [11]. The original database was filtered to capture the postings relevant for entry-level positions. Then entry-level postings suitable for tertiary graduates were filtered for business and management specializations and classified using a large-language model (LLM) along two indicators:

Is it an AI job: roles centered on building, deploying, or managing AI/ML/ LLM systems or AI-driven products?

Does it require usage of AI: roles requiring regular use of AI tools (e.g., copilots, data assistants, or analytics platforms) in daily work?

The analysis tracks shares rather than absolute numbers to enhance cross-country comparability and minimize potential source bias.

Demand for graduates

The distribution of entry-level opportunities continues to reflect structural differences across regions. In 2024, the **East Asia & Pacific region recorded the highest share of job postings targeting new graduates**, averaging around 11 percent of all vacancies, while the **MENA region remained the lowest**, highlighting a continued preference for experienced professionals. Europe sits between these two models, balancing "young-talent" and "experienced-talent" strategies. At one end, Luxembourg and Switzerland stand out as "young-brain hunters," with graduates representing 16 percent and 15 percent of postings respectively (of which 5 percent and 3 percent targeted business graduates). At the other end, Czechia, Portugal, Norway and Finland show a more senior orientation, with only 5–6 percent of vacancies aimed at new graduates and roughly 1-2 percent specifically for business disciplines (Figure 17).

Entry-level hiring is rebounding, led by East Asia's momentum. Across all regions, demand for young graduates strengthened after the 2022 slowdown (Figure 18). The East Asia & Pacific region led this rebound, with countries such as Malaysia showing double-digit growth in graduate hiring, reflecting renewed investment in entry-level talent to sustain post-pandemic expansion. In Europe, hiring activity stabilised by 2024 after an uneven path, with Ireland and Poland lagging behind following earlier contractions, while others recovered after a short 2023 pause linked to uncertainty about AI's disruptive effects. In MENA, momentum remained broadly positive: Saudi Arabia recorded only a brief dip in 2023 before resuming strong growth in 2024, supported by diversification and digital transformation programmes.

Figure 17. Share of Business Graduates and Other Graduates in All Job Postings



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

Overall, the rebound signals that **firms are reinvesting in graduate pipelines, recognising young graduates as essential to steering the next phase of AI-enabled transformation.**

Temporary slowdown may reflect early anxiety about AI displacement. The softening observed between 2022 and 2023 in several markets is consistent with early concerns that AI could replace entry-level roles. Subsequent cross-country research has since shown that the impact of AI adoption is more nuanced, characterised by task reconfiguration rather than widespread job loss. Productivity gains and the redistribution of routine tasks have helped stabilise demand by 2024 [12, 13, 14].

Figure 18. Share of Demand for Young Graduates in Total New Labour Demand 2022-2024



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

Reviews by the OECD and other international institutions confirm that AI exposure is highest in white-collar occupations, yet overall employment effects remain modest. The dominant pattern is task transformation, accompanied by productivity improvements and stronger performance where reskilling is active. This environment favours new graduates who combine business fundamentals with AI-literate analytical, automation, and product-development skills.

Demand for business graduates

The demand for business and management graduates varies markedly across regions, reflecting different stages of economic transformation and labour-market maturity. Among job postings targeting young graduates, the **MENA region shows the highest concentration of demand for business and management specializations, while Europe remains the most diversified** (Figure 19).

In MENA, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt rank among the global leaders, with over one-third (35%+) of all graduate-level vacancies seeking candidates with business or management backgrounds. This strong appetite reflects the region's rapid private-sector expansion, its growing emphasis on managerial and entrepreneurial talent, and national efforts to localise leadership roles within economic diversification programs such as Saudi Vision 2030.

Figure 19. Share of Business Graduates in Total Graduates, 2024



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

By contrast, **European labour markets show a more balanced portfolio** of graduate demand, with most countries allocating less than 20 percent of entry-level vacancies to business disciplines. Employers in these economies draw on a broader mix of specialisations, from STEM to social sciences, reflecting both a mature service-based economy and a structural shift toward interdisciplinary and hybrid roles. The East Asia & Pacific region occupies a middle ground, where business graduates remain in solid demand but share space with strong engineering, manufacturing, and digital sectors that diversify graduate opportunities.

Regional development models thus shape the demand for managerial talent: economies undergoing diversification and private-sector acceleration tend to prioritise business skills, while those with advanced industrial bases and established service sectors increasingly seek hybrid profiles that combine management, analytical, and technical competencies.

Figure 20. Share of Demand for Young Business / Management Graduates in Total New Demand for Young Graduates, 2022-2024



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

Across all regions, the **share of postings for business graduates rose in 2023 compared with 2022,** signaling renewed investment in managerial pipelines (Figure 20). By 2024, however, demand stabilized or declined in most regions with MENA again the exception, maintaining its upward trajectory. This moderation does not appear directly driven by AI displacement; instead, it likely reflects cyclical hiring adjustments, temporary saturation in graduate intake, and sectoral realignment following the post-pandemic recovery.

The broader trend suggests that AI adoption is influencing how demand evolves rather than whether it persists, gradually shifting the skill profile of business graduates rather than reducing their overall relevance.

Demand for AI skills among business graduates

To assess whether recent changes in hiring patterns reflect AI adoption or displacement effects, the analysis examines job requirements for young business and management graduates, focusing on whether employers expect them to use AI tools or possess the capabilities to develop and implement AI systems.

The findings show that **demand for AI-building and management skills among business graduates rose modestly in 2023 and accelerated sharply in 2024 across all regions**. This points to a growing need for AI literacy beyond technical fields, where even entry-level managers are increasingly expected to understand, coordinate, or supervise AI-enabled workflows (Figure 21).

Figure 21. Share of Job Vacancies with the Requirements of AI Build and Usage and AI Usage only by Region (left) and by Country (right)



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

In contrast, mentions of AI-usage skills increased in 2023 but declined markedly in 2024, following distinct regional paths. In MENA, demand remained stable until 2023 before falling the following year. In Europe, it spiked in 2023 before correcting, while in East Asia, it showed a gradual and steady decline throughout the period. This evolution suggests that as **AI tools become embedded in everyday business operations, employers no longer find it necessary to list them explicitly.** By 2024, basic AI usage had become an assumed competency rather than a differentiating skill (Figure 22).

While overall demand for AI-related skills among business graduates remains modest, it is growing fastest in advanced economies. Across all regions, the share of postings requiring AI-building or usage capabilities remains low, peaking at 9 percent in Norway and 7 percent in Sweden, while averaging only 2.2 percent for AI-building and 3.2 percent for combined AI-building and usage skills. This reflects that AI development continues to be viewed primarily as a software-oriented function rather than a core component of managerial skill sets, particularly at entry level.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of AI-related competencies in business roles and their concentration in European labour markets highlight a broader shift toward hybrid professional profiles that merge managerial, analytical, and technical literacy. Such multidimensional skill demand is increasingly recognised as a driver of innovation and productivity growth in knowledge-intensive economies.

Figure 22. Proportion of New Job Postings for Young Business Graduates that Require AI Build Capabilities (left) or Require Regular Use of AI Tools (right), 2022-2024



Source: Whiteshield, Future of Work Navigator

Note: if a job posting requires AI build capabilities – it automatically requires AI usage capabilities

In East Asia, which ranks second overall, Singapore emerges as a regional leader (third globally), while most neighbouring economies remain in the lower tier. MENA countries continue to occupy the lower half of the distribution, reflecting limited integration of AI-related competencies into business education and hiring practices, and significant variation across national approaches to workforce development.

The New Skill Frontier

Three complementary dynamics explain the evolution of AI-related employer demand among business graduates.

First, normalisation. The use of AI has become routine across corporate functions, and employers no longer highlight it in job descriptions. What was once a differentiating feature has become an operational standard [15].

Second, upgrading of expectations. Job requirements are shifting from the ability to use AI tools toward the capacity to build, oversee, and integrate AI systems. This change raises the entry threshold for new graduates and signals a deeper alignment between managerial and technological skills.

Third, refinement of demand. Firms are realising that competitive advantage depends not on basic AI familiarity, but on the ability to link AI deployment to business strategy, governance, and ethical standards. The focus has moved from general digital competence to applied intelligence that supports decision-making, innovation, and responsible management.

Together, **these dynamics illustrate a transition from AI exposure to AI competence.** Demand for young business and management graduates is recovering across regions, yet the skills required are changing fundamentally.

Employability now depends on the ability to combine analytical and managerial foundations with technological fluency and adaptive, human-centred judgement. This represents a new stage in labour-market evolution, where resilience is defined by the capacity to learn continuously and to translate technology into sustainable value creation.

From Skill Disruption to Adaptive Resilience

The evolution of AI demand reveals not only a technological shift but a test of institutional readiness. **The primary challenge is no longer access to technology, but the capacity of education, labour-market, and governance and innovation systems to adapt at speed.**

Across regions, different adjustment paths are evident. Early digital and industrial integration has supported faster alignment between technology and skills in some economies. Others have emphasised responsible AI frameworks and regulatory oversight, while a third group has advanced through state-led transformation programmes that expand managerial capacity and accelerate digital adoption. Despite these differences, a common constraint persists: technological change is advancing faster than skills formation and institutional adaptation.

This growing mismatch is becoming a decisive competitiveness risk. Employers increasingly demand graduates who can integrate, supervise, and govern AI systems, yet education and business curricula remain anchored in traditional models that do not adequately integrate data, digital systems, and human–machine interaction. Addressing this gap requires more than curriculum reform. **Governments should institutionalise continuous skills anticipation, strengthen partnerships between employers and education providers, and embed modular, stackable learning pathways that allow workers to update skills throughout their careers rather than only at entry points.**

The inclusivity of AI-driven transformation will also shape long-term labour-market resilience. Without broad-based access to digital and AI learning, employability gaps risk widening, particularly for women, youth, and workers in lagging regions. Policy responses should therefore prioritise equitable access to foundational digital skills, targeted support for underrepresented groups, and incentives for firms to invest in inclusive reskilling. Inclusion is not a social add-on; it is a resilience multiplier that expands the effective talent pool and reduces adjustment frictions.

More broadly, AI transformation must be governed as a labour-market transition, not only as an innovation agenda. Effective policy frameworks align technology diffusion with lifelong learning systems, active labour-market policies, and transition support for displaced workers. Where this alignment is weak, AI adoption tends to amplify labour-market polarisation even when aggregate productivity rises.

Ultimately, resilience in the AI era lies in the ability to absorb technological change, adapt through continuous learning, and transform by aligning human and digital intelligence. The policy challenge is not to shield jobs from technology, but to equip people and institutions to move with it. Economies that succeed will be those that treat skills, inclusion, and institutional agility as strategic assets, embedding them at the core of their AI and growth strategies.

CHAPTER 2:
GLRI TRADE FRAGMENTATION STRESS TEST – THE RESULTS

Table 2. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test 2026 Results by Sub-Index and Dimension

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)
Germany	1	78.18	4	81.36	4	76.59	8	73.52	1	82.73
Netherlands	2	78.07	1	85.97	10	74.12	12	71.29	11	79.79
Singapore	3	78.03	18	76.35	1	78.87	1	77.21	2	82.18
Sweden	4	77.88	8	80.88	5	76.38	6	74.60	10	79.95
UK	5	77.83	11	78.67	2	77.40	2	76.09	9	80.02
USA	6	77.46	6	81.30	6	75.54	3	75.95	21	74.73
Denmark	7	76.68	2	85.22	12	72.41	16	68.47	6	80.29
Switzerland	8	76.09	21	74.86	3	76.71	5	74.82	5	80.50
Finland	9	75.60	14	77.16	7	74.81	11	71.94	4	80.55
Korea	10	74.50	24	74.07	8	74.71	4	75.44	29	73.25
France	11	74.33	7	80.97	15	71.01	17	68.04	16	76.96
Belgium	12	74.08	5	81.34	16	70.45	19	67.80	19	75.76
Israel	13	73.67	28	72.41	9	74.29	7	73.65	20	75.58
Austria	14	73.49	3	83.19	21	68.64	22	65.79	24	74.33
Luxembourg	15	72.85	9	80.84	20	68.86	20	66.71	30	73.16
New Zealand	16	72.44	25	73.56	14	71.88	14	70.68	26	74.28
Estonia	17	72.14	17	76.44	19	70.00	21	66.23	15	77.53
Japan	18	71.29	26	73.51	18	70.18	24	65.20	8	80.15
Canada	19	71.16	15	76.83	23	68.33	13	70.82	51	63.34
Australia	20	70.71	43	66.57	11	72.78	10	71.99	23	74.36
Norway	21	70.70	38	67.59	13	72.26	15	68.56	12	79.65
Czechia	22	68.86	13	77.75	26	64.42	25	61.94	36	69.37
Spain	23	68.75	12	78.26	28	64.00	33	57.10	14	77.81
Iceland	24	68.73	45	65.54	17	70.33	9	72.67	44	65.65
Ireland	25	68.51	32	70.08	24	67.72	23	65.62	32	71.92
China	26	67.93	40	67.09	22	68.35	18	67.88	37	69.28
Portugal	27	67.86	19	76.26	29	63.66	26	59.65	33	71.69
Lithuania	28	67.77	20	75.01	27	64.15	32	57.30	13	77.85
Poland	29	67.68	10	78.79	33	62.13	30	57.93	34	70.51
UAE	30	67.54	29	72.41	25	65.10	31	57.55	7	80.19
Italy	31	66.82	16	76.61	34	61.93	37	55.58	22	74.63
Latvia	32	66.04	27	73.06	30	62.54	40	55.50	17	76.62
Slovenia	33	63.61	31	70.75	37	60.04	29	57.98	48	64.18
Croatia	34	63.22	30	71.62	40	59.02	43	52.42	31	72.22
Slovakia	35	63.20	36	69.16	36	60.22	39	55.50	35	69.67
Cyprus	36	63.16	50	64.57	31	62.46	36	55.62	18	76.14
Hungary	37	62.97	33	69.82	39	59.55	35	55.65	39	67.35
Malaysia	38	62.42	42	66.57	35	60.34	28	58.69	50	63.64
Romania	39	61.66	22	74.58	44	55.20	47	49.57	41	66.47
Thailand	40	60.79	34	69.48	42	56.45	41	53.50	54	62.35
Qatar	41	60.55	75	57.38	32	62.13	42	52.48	3	81.42

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)
Malta	42	59.72	58	62.13	41	58.52	38	55.54	47	64.47
Greece	43	58.81	49	64.97	43	55.74	57	46.50	27	74.22
Bulgaria	44	58.69	37	68.36	49	53.86	45	50.58	60	60.43
India	45	58.61	23	74.37	58	50.72	71	43.02	42	66.13
Serbia	46	57.96	47	65.24	48	54.32	51	49.06	45	64.86
Turkey	47	57.96	35	69.19	54	52.34	61	44.78	38	67.46
Bahrain	48	57.31	94	52.04	38	59.95	27	59.44	59	60.98
Vietnam	49	56.45	59	61.98	50	53.69	44	51.76	68	57.55
Morocco	50	56.28	65	59.72	47	54.56	63	44.69	25	74.31
Philippines	51	56.20	52	63.95	55	52.33	55	47.37	55	62.24
Chile	52	55.96	70	58.06	46	54.92	50	49.08	40	66.59
Uruguay	53	55.78	60	61.71	53	52.81	56	47.30	49	63.85
Indonesia	54	54.75	39	67.50	65	48.38	69	43.18	66	58.76
Costa Rica	55	54.00	53	63.01	61	49.49	67	43.55	58	61.38
Oman	56	53.80	98	51.06	45	55.17	46	50.47	46	64.58
Saudi Arabia	57	53.77	81	55.27	51	53.02	54	48.06	52	62.93
Jordan	58	53.60	48	65.24	71	47.79	72	42.59	67	58.17
Albania	59	53.29	54	62.72	63	48.57	62	44.75	70	56.20
Barbados	60	53.22	67	58.32	59	50.68	48	49.52	83	53.00
Tunisia	61	52.99	51	64.24	73	47.36	87	38.07	43	65.95
Mexico	62	52.87	44	65.97	74	46.31	65	44.52	87	49.89
Brazil	63	52.76	74	57.45	60	50.41	52	48.42	77	54.40
Kazakhstan	64	52.73	92	52.24	52	52.97	49	49.42	62	60.07
Kuwait	65	52.45	89	52.87	56	52.24	78	41.41	28	73.91
South Africa	66	52.39	62	61.27	70	47.95	73	42.23	65	59.38
Egypt	67	52.21	41	67.07	82	44.79	93	36.17	57	62.03
Georgia	68	52.12	63	60.30	69	48.03	53	48.16	94	47.77
Mauritius	69	52.10	46	65.45	79	45.43	66	44.26	95	47.77
North Macedonia	70	52.05	66	59.04	64	48.56	64	44.57	69	56.52
Kenya	71	51.17	57	62.42	78	45.54	86	38.60	64	59.42
Colombia	72	51.12	76	57.13	67	48.11	74	42.16	63	60.01
Russia	73	51.11	103	50.64	57	51.34	34	56.15	104	41.73
Ukraine	74	51.01	82	55.01	62	49.01	60	45.61	73	55.82
Peru	75	50.59	80	55.59	68	48.10	75	41.96	61	60.37
Armenia	76	49.26	72	57.69	81	45.04	70	43.02	89	49.07
Panama	77	48.95	95	51.51	72	47.66	84	40.27	53	62.45
Argentina	78	48.70	83	54.94	77	45.58	76	41.73	82	53.28
Jamaica	79	48.45	87	53.17	76	46.09	59	46.02	97	46.22
B&H	80	48.44	77	56.84	83	44.24	95	35.30	56	62.13
Ecuador	81	47.81	100	50.96	75	46.24	79	41.37	71	55.98
Uzbekistan	82	47.57	68	58.13	85	42.30	83	40.51	98	45.87
Senegal	83	47.36	64	60.16	92	40.96	105	33.50	72	55.89
Dominican Republic	84	47.15	55	62.68	98	39.39	97	34.85	90	48.46
Tanzania	85	47.02	84	54.81	84	43.12	85	39.25	86	50.85

Country	GLRI Rank	GLRI Score (0-100)	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Cyclical Rank	Cyclical Score (0-100)	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)
Sri Lanka	86	46.99	73	57.62	86	41.67	94	35.37	78	54.29
Azerbaijan	87	46.33	112	42.45	66	48.26	58	46.26	84	52.27
Bhutan	88	46.19	79	56.43	91	41.06	102	34.25	76	54.69
Kyrgyzstan	89	46.09	78	56.51	93	40.88	68	43.48	107	35.67
Ghana	90	45.99	107	47.17	80	45.39	81	41.13	79	53.92
Pakistan	91	45.29	69	58.12	99	38.87	111	30.74	75	55.13
El Salvador	92	45.21	61	61.47	104	37.09	110	31.01	88	49.25
Côte d'Ivoire	93	45.08	88	53.01	90	41.11	98	34.77	80	53.81
Cambodia	94	44.54	93	52.10	94	40.76	89	37.15	93	47.96
Paraguay	95	44.44	86	53.97	97	39.67	91	36.84	99	45.32
Guatemala	96	44.15	56	62.64	106	34.91	115	26.66	85	51.42
Bolivia	97	44.06	101	50.88	95	40.65	92	36.78	91	48.39
Benin	98	44.04	90	52.64	96	39.73	90	37.15	100	44.90
Lebanon	99	43.10	91	52.38	101	38.46	104	33.52	92	48.34
Mongolia	100	42.06	97	51.38	102	37.40	77	41.57	113	29.07
Botswana	101	41.88	111	43.27	88	41.19	82	40.64	102	42.28
Namibia	102	41.34	102	50.87	105	36.57	107	32.56	101	44.59
Zambia	103	40.81	115	40.11	89	41.16	96	35.08	81	53.30
Honduras	104	40.73	85	54.05	108	34.07	113	27.27	96	47.66
Cameroon	105	40.26	110	43.57	100	38.61	88	37.72	105	40.39
Rwanda	106	40.22	96	51.46	107	34.60	103	34.23	109	35.36
Nigeria	107	40.10	116	37.38	87	41.46	100	34.41	74	55.56
Algeria	108	39.71	109	44.95	103	37.09	80	41.34	116	28.60
Laos	109	38.76	104	49.71	109	33.28	106	33.15	111	33.55
Bangladesh	110	38.16	99	51.00	112	31.74	99	34.66	117	25.92
Nepal	111	36.86	71	57.81	117	26.39	112	30.56	119	18.04
Ethiopia	112	36.60	106	47.52	113	31.14	108	31.64	112	30.16
Iran	113	36.57	105	48.36	114	30.68	101	34.38	118	23.27
Guinea	114	35.07	113	41.19	111	32.01	114	27.11	103	41.81
Tajikistan	115	33.23	108	45.32	115	27.19	116	23.54	110	34.47
Burkina Faso	116	30.30	114	40.69	118	25.11	117	23.28	114	28.75
Mali	117	30.10	117	36.58	116	26.86	118	22.42	106	35.72
Venezuela	118	29.53	120	23.26	110	32.67	109	31.24	108	35.52
Congo DR	119	25.45	119	30.39	119	22.98	120	20.10	115	28.74
Iraq	120	24.18	118	32.77	120	19.89	119	21.90	120	15.87

Source: Whiteshield

The trade-focused edition of the GLRI 2026 introduces a new lens: how national labour markets withstand and adapt to trade-related shocks in an era of global fragmentation.

Unlike the AI disruptions analysed in the 2025 edition, trade shocks test a different set of foundations. They do not primarily hinge on innovation capacity or AI-related labour-market factors but instead on economic diversification, policy coherence, and institutional flexibility. The 2026 findings show that countries' ability to sustain employment and income stability increasingly depends on how resiliently they are integrated into the global trading system.

TOP 10 COUNTRIES

The 2026 GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test marks a notable reshuffling among global leaders in labour and trade resilience. Economies that once topped the rankings under the AI-resilience lens now face greater exposure when tested against trade fragmentation and supply-chain stress.

Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore lead the 2026 Trade Fragmentation Stress Test (Figure 23). Their institutional depth, diversified export bases, and highly efficient logistics ecosystems underpin their resilience to external shocks while still hiding certain weaknesses, especially in trade adaptive capacity.

All leading European economies maintain broad-based resilience across both AI and trade dimensions, reaffirming governance quality and strong social partnership as enduring stabilizers. One of the most notable shifts is the Netherlands rising to second place in the rankings, driven largely by its highly efficient customs processes, transparent trade regulations, ad one of the world's most advanced logistics networks.

Figure 23. Top 10 Countries' Rankings and Scores in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

By contrast, the United States has fallen outside the top five despite its strong innovation base. High exposure to global value-chain reconfigurations, import concentration, and recurrent tariff and geopolitical tensions have weakened its absorptive capacity.

Korea also slipped in the rankings, reflecting mostly limited export and import diversification and heavy dependence on major trading partners.

The next section profiles the top three performers and examines how the world's two largest economies (the United States and China) are redefining global resilience amid growing strategic competition.

1: Germany: Diversified Strength, Structural Constraints

Figure 24. Overview of Germany Rankings in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield
Note: the arrow shows rank increase or decrease comparing to the country rank in GLRI 2026

Germany tops the 2026 Trade Fragmentation Stress Test rankings, demonstrating balanced performance across absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities with only a moderate lag in adaptive capacity (Figure 24).

Its absorptive capacity remains exceptional, supported by one of the world's most diversified export structures and deep integration into multiple regional and global markets. This breadth cushions employment and output from sector- or partner-specific shocks, sustaining stability even amid trade realignments.

However, adaptive capacity is more constrained. Complex regulatory frameworks, limited labour mobility, and trade-restrictive measures slow adjustment to rapidly changing conditions. The very industrial depth that underpins competitiveness also inhibits flexibility, delaying structural shifts toward new sectors and technologies.

Germany's transformative capacity is anchored in world-class logistics, efficient customs systems, and a highly innovative industrial ecosystem. These strengths enable gradual repositioning toward higher-value, greener, and more technology-intensive production. Yet reliance on imported critical materials and exposure to geopolitical realignments, especially in advanced manufacturing inputs, constitute growing vulnerabilities.

Germany's experience shows that diversification shields economies from shocks, but institutional agility determines the speed and sustainability of recovery. The next frontier for Europe's largest exporter lies in translating industrial strength into greater adaptive flexibility.

2: Netherlands: Transformative Strength, Supply Vulnerabilities

Figure 25. Overview of Netherlands Rankings in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield
Note: the arrow shows rank increase or decrease comparing to the country rank in GLRI 2026

The Netherlands ranks second globally in the Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, reflecting strong and well-balanced resilience across trade and labour dimensions (Figure 25).

Its transformative capacity stands out among global leaders, supported by highly efficient customs procedures, transparent trade regulations, and one of the most advanced logistics networks in the world. These advantages help sustain employment and output even during periods of global supply-chain disruption.

The Netherlands also maintains solid absorptive capacity, reinforced by a diversified mix of trading partners and a vibrant services sector that buffers external shocks. Yet its dependence on imported raw materials and intermediate goods remains a persistent vulnerability during global supply shortages.

Adaptive capacity is comparatively weaker. A large share of employment is concentrated in trade-intensive sectors, which makes short-term shocks more likely to generate significant labour-market disruptions before adjustment mechanisms can take effect. In addition, the presence of several trade-distorting policies creates further vulnerabilities for workers and firms.

The Dutch experience highlights that openness must be matched by diversification. The quality of trade systems and infrastructure is essential, but long-term resilience also depends on expanding the breadth of trade partners and ensuring that labour markets can adjust rapidly to external change.

3: Singapore: Balancing Efficiency and Exposure

Figure 26. Overview of Singapore Rankings in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield
Note: the arrow shows rank increase or decrease comparing to the country rank in GLRI 2026

Singapore ranks third globally in the 2026 Trade Fragmentation Stress Test and remains one of the world's benchmarks for trade efficiency and logistics foresight (Figure 26).

Its transformative capacity is exceptionally strong, supported by advanced logistics systems, world-class customs administration, and extensive use of digital technologies in border management. These features enable Singapore to sustain trade flows and employment even during severe global disruptions.

The country's absorptive capacity is reinforced by regulatory predictability, political stability, and a pro-trade environment that limits exposure to geopolitical tensions. However, its **narrow base of trading partners and heavy reliance on a small number of critical suppliers increase its sensitivity to external shocks.**

Adaptive capacity depends largely on the agility of its labour market. With a significant share of employment linked to trade-related sectors, Singapore's ability to redeploy and upskill workers rapidly determines the extent of its resilience.

Singapore's experience demonstrates that institutional excellence can offset geographic and size constraints, but lasting resilience requires continuous investment in human capital and diversification of trade linkages.

United States: Innovation Powerhouse, Trade Fragility

Figure 27. Overview of United States Rankings in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield
Note: the arrow shows rank increase or decrease comparing to the country rank in GLRI 2026

The United States stands at the center of today's global trade realignment. It combines extraordinary technological dynamism with growing exposure to trade tensions, making it both a driver and a casualty of global fragmentation.

In the 2026 Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, **the United States ranks 21st in trade resilience, reflecting a marked contrast between strong adaptive capacity and weaker absorptive capacity.** Despite its economic scale, its position is constrained by moderate import-diversification risks, recurring tariff cycles, and dependence on critical imported materials (Figure 27).

The country's absorptive capacity remains limited, ranking 41st globally. High exposure to supply-chain reconfigurations and policy-driven volatility reduces its ability to cushion shocks. Trade-policy uncertainty has contributed to fluctuations in manufacturing employment and investment, illustrating how policy changes can transmit rapidly through labour markets.

By contrast, adaptive capacity is more robust. The United States benefits from a relatively low share of employment in trade-intensive sectors, which reduces the likelihood that short-term trade disruptions will result in widespread job losses. At the same time, although the services sector remains relatively open, the overall trade environment is affected by a significant number of trade-distorting measures that constrain flexibility and increase adjustment pressures.

Transformative capacity could be stronger. The United States would benefit from greater participation in integration efforts rather than relying on reciprocal tariff policies that introduce additional distortions. Customs performance remains strong and broadly aligned with global best practice, yet policy choices in other areas continue to weaken the impact of these structural strengths.

Flexible labour markets and a diversified domestic economy support adaptive capacity, but persistent tariff frictions and a more fragmented global value-chain landscape limit the effective transmission of transformative strengths into labour-market resilience.

The United States illustrates a central paradox of modern resilience: technological leadership and institutional capacity do not guarantee economic stability when exposure to policy-induced trade shocks remains elevated. Recent reciprocal tariff measures disproportionately hurt the US agriculture and durable manufacturing sectors by reducing output and employment and increasing prices [18]. They have also begun to slow import flows, raising input costs for domestic industries, particularly those dependent on intermediate and capital goods. This has reduced supply-chain efficiency, discouraged foreign sourcing and investment, and softened production growth and labour demand (Figure 28).

Figure 28. Monthly U.S. Import and Export Values (left) and Seasonally Adjusted Nonfarm Payroll Changes (right), 2023–2025 [19]



Source: Whiteshield, Bureau of Labour Statistics

This figure presents two complementary indicators of U.S. economic conditions. The left panel shows monthly import and export values between January 2024 and July 2025, illustrating the evolution of trade flows over a period of heightened global uncertainty. After the declaration of reciprocal tariffs on 2 April 2025 import values have fallen sharply. The right panel reports the seasonally adjusted month-to-month change in nonfarm payroll employment from August 2023 to August 2025, capturing short-term shifts in labour-market momentum. The employment growth has fallen to nearly-zero simultaneously with the import fall. Together, these series highlight the interaction between external demand conditions and domestic employment dynamics.

China: Strong In AI Resilience, Exposed In Trade

Figure 29. Overview of China Rankings in the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield
Note: the arrow shows rank increase or decrease comparing to the country rank in GLRI 2026

China continues to display high resilience to technological disruption but remains vulnerable to trade-related shocks. In the 2026 Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, China ranks 26th, compared with 15th in GLRI 2026 resilience, highlighting a divergence between its digital capacity and its exposure to trade fragmentation (Figure 29).

China's absorptive capacity benefits from its scale, diversified production base, and strong manufacturing competitiveness. These factors help sustain output and employment during external disruptions. However, high dependence on imported critical raw materials and intermediate components limits its ability to absorb global supply shocks.

Adaptive capacity shows greater constraints. A relatively high incidence of trade-distorting measures, restrictions in services trade and a large share of employment in trade-intensive sectors reduce flexibility and slow the pace of labour-market adjustment when global conditions shift.

Transformative capacity benefits from ongoing investments in infrastructure, logistics and industrial upgrading. At the same time, geopolitical frictions and partial decoupling from major markets continue to shape China's external environment and affect its ability to reposition in global value chains.

From a strategic perspective, China's exposure to fragmentation pressures strengthens the case for enhancing regulatory transparency, improving the predictability of trade and investment measures, and deepening engagement in international rule-making. Greater participation in global standards and clearer communication of domestic policies would support both adaptive and transformative capacity, thereby improving long-term resilience.

China and the United States thus represent contrasting resilience profiles, with different combinations of technological strength, trade exposure and institutional capacity. Together they illustrate how large economies can shape, but not fully determine, the global landscape of trade resilience in an era of strategic competition.

The contrasting experiences of the United States and China show that no economy is immune to the pressures of global fragmentation. Technological power, market scale or industrial depth on their own cannot guarantee resilience when interdependence becomes a source of vulnerability.

As supply chains reorganize and trade alliances evolve, the ability of countries to withstand shocks increasingly depends on the strength of their regional and institutional networks. Collective mechanisms, whether through shared markets, coordinated regulation or cross-border production systems, are becoming important anchors of stability.

The following section examines how major regional blocs are shaping this next frontier of resilience and how cooperation at the regional level can amplify or weaken national capacity to absorb, adapt and transform in response to global disruption.

Trade Blocs: Collective Resilience Under Stress

The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test shows that resilience depends not only on national characteristics but also on the ability of regional integration systems to manage shocks collectively.

Trade blocs shape resilience through shared markets, coordinated regulation, and cross-border production systems that can either magnify or cushion the effects of global disruption.

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) strengthen absorptive capacity by broadening trade links among members and enhance adaptive and transformative capacity through common standards, policy coordination, and mechanisms that facilitate labour and capital mobility.

This section examines four major regional blocs that together capture distinct models of regional integration shaping global trade today.

The European Union (EU) stands as the world's most advanced and institutionalised form of economic cooperation, combining a single market with shared social and labour frameworks.

The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemplifies the North American model of supply-chain interdependence grounded in flexible markets and private-sector responsiveness.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) anchors Asia's manufacturing and innovation hub, connecting economies with diverse income levels and trade structures.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reflects an emerging model of diversification and reform, where coordinated policies aim to convert resource wealth into long-term adaptive and transformative capacity.

Beyond these four blocs, a diverse set of regional frameworks is also reshaping patterns of collective resilience.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) seeks to transform Africa's fragmented markets into a unified trading area that supports industrialisation and job creation.

MERCOSUR in Latin America demonstrates both the potential and limits of regional cooperation where economic interdependence is constrained by political divergence.

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) illustrate how modern trade governance and flexible, open regionalism can enhance labour adaptability through digitalisation, services, and mobility.

Together, these initiatives capture how regional cooperation strengthens collective stability and drives adaptive transformation in an era of fragmentation.

The European Union: Diversified but Rigid.

The European Union leads globally in overall trade resilience. Its large and diversified single market, supported by strong labour institutions, provides solid absorptive and transformative foundations (Figure 30).

These strengths allow member states to cushion shocks through internal demand, coordinated fiscal responses, and well-developed adjustment mechanisms.

However, high employment exposure to external trade and trade distorting policies continue to limit adaptive flexibility.

The EU's challenge lies in maintaining openness while reforming internal regulations to accelerate adjustment to shifting global conditions.

USMCA: Deep Markets, Limited Flexibility

The USMCA ranks second in overall trade resilience, underpinned by the structural strengths of its member economies. Its tightly integrated supply chains and open investment frameworks support high efficiency and strong recovery potential.

Yet the bloc records the lowest absorptive capacity among major groupings, reflecting concentrated intra-bloc trade and dependence on U.S. economic cycles.

Persistent protectionist tendencies within the region further constrain adaptive capacity.

The USMCA demonstrates that deep market integration can strengthen efficiency but does not automatically translate into flexibility under fragmentation stress.

Figure 30. Trade Blocks Performance in GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, by Trade Dimension and by Pillar



Source: Whiteshield

RCEP: Balanced but Exposed

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ranks third, displaying a balanced resilience profile across absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities.

Its strengths include relatively low trade restrictiveness, limited use of trade-distorting policies, strong regional production networks, and reduced external exposure through extensive intra-bloc sourcing of intermediate goods. Employment vulnerability to trade shocks also varies across members, and several economies benefit from diversified labour structures that soften the impact of external disruptions.

However, integration remains concentrated within the region with limited diversification toward global markets. Customs and logistics performance is uneven across members, and the bloc's heavy reliance on manufacturing with less development of high-value services exposes economies to supply-chain interruptions. These vulnerabilities are further shaped by rising geopolitical tensions that affect key industries across the region.

The RCEP experience shows that scale and industrial depth need to be complemented by broader strategic diversification in order to sustain resilience in a period of growing trade fragmentation.

GCC: Adaptive and Stable

The Gulf Cooperation Council ranks fourth overall but second in the trade-resilience dimension.

Its adaptive capacity is the strongest globally, supported by efficient customs systems, low trade-distortion policies, and limited labour exposure in trade-intensive sectors.

Strong fiscal buffers and coordinated policy responses have further enhanced resilience to external shocks.

Nonetheless, dependence on imported critical inputs and moderate export diversification remain key vulnerabilities.

The GCC illustrates that strong governance, fiscal prudence, and policy agility can substitute for economic scale in achieving sustained resilience.

Across these blocs, the Trade Fragmentation Stress Test confirms that collective resilience depends as much on the quality of integration as on its depth.

Open, flexible, and well-coordinated systems outperform rigid or narrowly concentrated ones. In an era where fragmentation is structural, the capacity to adjust collectively has become a defining source of economic strength.

Patterns of Resilience to Trade Shocks

The analysis of the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test results reveals distinct patterns that explain why some economies can absorb and adapt to trade disruptions and transform more effectively than others. The accompanying figures highlight four key insights emerging from the data.

1. Trade openness contributes to resilience only when it is supported by diversification

Figure 31 shows that the relationship between total trade exposure and absorptive capacity is positive but modest, with a correlation of 0.3. This indicates that openness alone is not a reliable predictor of resilience. The strongest performers on both metrics - Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore - combine high trade volumes with diversified export structures and a broad mix of trading partners. Their ability to spread risk across markets shields employment from sudden external shocks.

Figure 31 also highlights the opposite pattern. Economies with high trade volumes but narrow export baskets or concentrated partner networks cluster in the lower-right quadrant of the chart. Their openness increases their exposure rather than reducing it. Commodity-reliant exporters and countries tied to a single dominant trading partner show the weakest absorptive scores, demonstrating that without diversification, more trade can amplify vulnerability instead of mitigating it.

Figure 31. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Absorptive Capacity Scores versus Total Trade by Country



Source: Whiteshield, CEPII

This pattern confirms that **the composition of trade, not its scale, determines labour resilience.** Countries with varied supply chains and balanced export portfolios experience fewer employment shocks when global demand shifts.

2. Adaptive capacity is not correlated with trade volume

Figure 32 underscores that large trading nations are not necessarily the most adaptive. Many of the world's top exporters, such as the United States, China, and Japan, fall near the middle of the adaptive-capacity spectrum. Their large labour forces, deep industrial ecosystems, and policy inertia slow short-term adjustment.

Figure 32. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Adaptive Capacity Scores versus Total Trade by Country, 2023



Source: Whiteshield, CEPII

Conversely, smaller or service-oriented economies, particularly the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, display high adaptive flexibility. Their limited workforce exposure to trade sectors, strong fiscal buffers, and flexible labour policies allow them to redeploy skills and reorient industries quickly. The data therefore suggest that adaptability stems from institutional agility rather than trade intensity.

3. Quantity of trade agreements does not equate to openness

The correlation results in Figure 33 show that trade volumes are strongly associated with the prevalence of trade-distorting policies, but not with wider integration efforts. Many economies that trade heavily remain selectively integrated, relying on market size and bilateral arrangements rather than broad, rules-based multilateral frameworks.

There is also no meaningful relationship between the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) a country signs and its actual level of trade liberalisation. Several economies with numerous RTAs continue to maintain high counts of trade-distorting measures. This "commitment–implementation gap" illustrates that formal participation in trade agreements does not automatically translate into more open or resilient trade systems.

The quality, depth, and enforcement of trade agreements, rather than their sheer quantity, are the factors that determine their ability to strengthen trade resilience and adaptive capacity.

Figure 33. Correlation between Total Trade Values and Total Number of Trade Distorting Policies and Number of RTAs, 2024



Source: Whiteshield, Global Trade Alert

In practice, the quality and enforcement of trade agreements, particularly those that facilitate customs efficiency, standards alignment, and digital trade, matter far more than numerical participation. Countries such as Singapore and Chile illustrate that well-implemented RTAs can enhance both trade openness and adaptive capacity, while others remain constrained by protectionist reflexes.

4. Employment exposure reflects export dependence rather than export scale

The employment–export linkage diagram shows that the share of workers tied to export activities aligns much more closely with how dependent an economy is on exports than with the overall size of its exports. This distinction is central to understanding labour-market vulnerability during trade shocks (Figure 34).

Smaller and highly export-dependent economies such as Ireland, Malaysia, and Vietnam place a significant share of their workforce in export-oriented sectors. This deep engagement makes employment highly sensitive to external demand fluctuations and increases the risk of labour-market volatility when global conditions deteriorate.

Figure 34. Domestic Employment Embodied in Gross Export versus Export to GDP ratio (left) and Total Export (right), 2020



Source: Whiteshield, OECD, CEPII

By contrast, large economies with substantial domestic markets, including the United States and China, can sustain very high levels of exports while employing a relatively small proportion of their workers in export sectors. The domestic economy absorbs much of the labour force, creating a natural buffer that limits the employment impact of trade disruptions.

This asymmetry reveals a key insight: employment fragility rises with export dependence, not with export scale. Economies that rely heavily on external demand for jobs face sharper labour-market adjustments during shocks, regardless of how large or competitive their export sectors may be.

5. Advanced exporters depend on critical materials, but efficiency in value conversion determines resilience

Figure 35 shows a clear positive relationship between advanced manufacturing exports and imports of critical raw materials (CRMs). Economies that excel in producing high-value goods inevitably require substantial CRM inputs. However, the data also reveal that resilience is shaped not by the volume of CRM imports, but by how effectively countries convert these inputs into high-value output.

Advanced exporters such as Germany, Japan, and Korea achieve high value-added-to-CRM ratios. This indicates strong technological capabilities, efficient production systems, and mature industrial ecosystems that can absorb supply shocks more effectively. These economies remain dependent on imported CRMs, yet they use them efficiently enough to maintain competitiveness even when supply chains come under strain.

Figure 35. Advanced Technologies Exports versus Critical Materials Imports, log scale, 2023



Source: Whiteshield, CEPII

In contrast, several emerging exporters register low efficiency ratios. They depend heavily on imported intermediates but convert them into relatively limited value added. This makes them more vulnerable to CRM disruptions, as bottlenecks translate quickly into lost output and employment instability.

The evidence from Figure W underscores a key insight: industrial resilience does not come from self-sufficiency in inputs, but from the ability to transform critical materials into high-value goods through innovation, productivity, and secure supply relationships.

Policy Implications

Taken together, the five findings show that **trade resilience does not stem from the scale of global engagement but from the structure and quality of that engagement.** Resilience emerges when economies diversify their exposure, strengthen the institutions that support rapid adjustment, and use global inputs efficiently to generate high-value production.

The evidence shows that openness alone is insufficient. Economies that expand trade without broadening their export base or deepening partner networks become more, not less exposed to external shocks. This also applies to employment: what matters is not how large an export sector is, but how dependent workers are on a narrow set of markets or products. Reducing this dependency requires diversification, more flexible labour-market arrangements, and social protection systems that cushion adjustment.

Institutional agility is essential. Because adaptive capacity is not linked to trade volume, governments must focus on the speed and coherence of their policy responses, modernising customs, logistics, regulatory processes, and skills systems so firms and workers can shift quickly when disruptions occur. Trade agreements must reinforce this agility. The number of agreements matters far less than their depth, enforcement, and ability to reduce distortions and expand high-quality market access.

The findings also show that advanced exporters succeed not by avoiding critical material dependencies but by converting these inputs into high-value output through innovation and efficient industrial ecosystems. Industrial resilience therefore depends on strengthening value conversion, securing diversified supply relationships, and investing in technology rather than pursuing unattainable self-sufficiency.

Overall, the policy message is clear: resilient economies are not those that attempt to shield themselves from global markets, but those that engage the world strategically by being broadly diversified, institutionally agile, and technologically capable of turning global inputs into competitive advantage.

Regional analysis: Diverging Strengths, Converging Pathways

The GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test reveals both continuity and transformation in regional labour resilience to trade disruptions. **While the traditional hierarchy of North America, Europe, and East Asia persists**, the data and Figure 36 point to **narrowing performance gaps and rising adaptive momentum across several emerging regions.** The distance between the highest- and lowest-performing regions has contracted from 41 points in the GLRI 2026 to 32 points in the Trade Fragmentation Stress Test signalling gradual global convergence in resilience capabilities.

Figure 36. Regional GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Ranking, Average Scores and Leading Countries



Source: Whiteshield

North America (United States and Canada): Innovation Depth, Structural Imbalance

North America continues to lead globally in labour resilience to trade shocks. Its position is supported by world-class innovation ecosystems, flexible labour markets, and strong fiscal buffers.

The region's transformative capacity is significantly stronger than its absorptive capacity, which indicates that it relies more on technological progress than on broad economic diversification. This imbalance creates exposure to swings in employment when trade tensions rise. High productivity has not translated into evenly shared benefits, and participation in trade-related employment remains uneven across sectors and communities. In other words, the ability to generate advanced output does not guarantee widespread resilience among workers who depend on trade.

The United States anchors the region's performance but also illustrates its vulnerabilities, combining exceptional innovation strength with trade fragility that is amplified by policy uncertainty and concentration risks.

Europe: Institutional Resilience Under Pressure

Europe remains the second-most resilient region overall, and the gap with North America is narrower than in the AI-driven resilience results. Strong governance systems, comprehensive social protections, and diversified trade partnerships support Europe's absorptive and adaptive capacities. Europe also exhibits the most balanced profile across all three pillars of resilience and across both the traditional and trade-stress dimensions. This reflects the region's institutional coherence and its ability to coordinate policy across multiple levels of government.

Despite these strengths, Europe faces constraints in converting structural resilience into rapid adjustment. Slower regulatory adaptation and uneven national responses to global supply-chain shifts limit the region's flexibility. The central challenge for Europe is to transform its strong institutional foundations into greater adaptive speed, allowing its labour markets to respond as quickly as those in North America and emerging Asian leaders.

East Asia & the Pacific: Adaptive Strength, Strategic Exposure

East Asia and the Pacific ranks third globally in the GLRI 2026, reflecting strong technological readiness and firm-level adaptability. In the trade-fragmentation dimension, economies such as Korea and Singapore demonstrate notable strengths in logistics performance and trade reorientation capacity, although the broader region exhibits a more balanced rather than uniformly strong adaptive profile.

China's outsized role in regional value chains adds both depth and dependency: its capacity to absorb shocks benefits neighbours integrated into its supply network but also synchronises their vulnerabilities. The region's priority will be to reduce concentration risks while leveraging its adaptive agility to move up the technological ladder.

Middle East & North Africa (MENA): Adaptive Momentum, Structural Volatility

MENA records the strongest upward movement in this year's rankings, moving ahead of Central Asia and the Caucasus to reach fourth place.

This improvement is driven primarily by adaptive agility. Gulf economies have advanced reforms in trade facilitation, reduced trade distortions, expanded digital infrastructure, and strengthened support for SMEs. The region's adaptive capacity has increased significantly even though structural diversification in trade remains limited.

Oil-linked dependencies continue to shape exposure to external shocks, yet the growth of non-oil sectors such as logistics, digital services, and manufacturing is gradually improving labour-market resilience. Collective policy coordination across the GCC has been central to this progress, demonstrating how strong governance and substantial fiscal space can compensate for relatively narrow economic structures and modest economic size.

Central Asia & South Caucasus: Transitional Resilience

Central Asia and the South Caucasus have maintained their position in fifth place, reflecting a mix of gradual progress and persistent structural constraints. Limited economic diversification, exposure to geopolitical tensions, and dependence on a narrow set of commodities and remittance flows continue to shape the region's resilience profile.

The region combines low absorptive capacity with moderate adaptability. Investments in regional infrastructure and the emergence of new trade corridors linking Asia and Europe have supported some ability to adjust to disruptions, although these developments remain insufficient to fully address deeper vulnerabilities.

Strengthening resilience over time will require reforms that expand financial inclusion, upgrade workforce capabilities, and broaden the economic base. A deliberate shift from extraction-led employment toward technology-enabled and higher-value production is essential for more durable and broad-based resilience.

South Asia and Latin America and Carribean: Young Workforces, Shallow Buffers

South Asia and Latin America occupy lower positions in the rankings and display similar resilience profiles. Both regions benefit from young populations and expanding digital sectors, which create significant adaptive potential. Yet their progress is constrained by limited fiscal space, high levels of labour informality, and concentrated trade structures.

Absorptive capacity remains below the global median. Rising export volumes have not translated into stronger protection against shocks because diversification is limited, internal and external tensions persist, and reliance on critical imported inputs remains high. These factors weaken the ability of both regions to cushion workers during downturns. Transformative capacity is also held back by infrastructure gaps and inefficient customs systems that slow adjustment.

Within South Asia, India's growing strength in services exports provides a partial buffer against volatility. In contrast, Latin America's continued dependence on commodities heightens exposure to swings in global prices and demand. For both regions, sustained improvement will require stronger social protection systems and investments in skills that match the opportunities emerging from new regional trade corridors.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Demographic Dividend, Institutional Fragility

Sub-Saharan Africa remains the lowest-ranked region, although there are encouraging signs of improvement in adaptive capacity. Demographic dynamism and expanding digital connectivity are gradually strengthening the region's ability to adjust to shocks. A young labour force and growing participation in regional trade agreements also create latent potential for resilience.

Despite these emerging strengths, weak institutional frameworks, limited export diversification, and inadequate logistics infrastructure continue to hinder broader transformation. The region's resilience prospects depend on harnessing its demographic advantage through stronger education systems, deeper cross-border integration, and targeted industrial policies that shift production and exports from primary commodities toward higher-value manufacturing and services.

Resilience Under Technological and Trade Disruption: Insights from the GLRI

Two disruptions, one framework: the 2026 GLRI includes two complementary measures (original GLRI and GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test) each capturing a distinct form of systemic disruption (Figure 37). The AI version assesses how well labour markets adjust to technological transformation, while the trade version examines resilience to external shocks such as tariff cycles, supply-chain fragmentation and geopolitical tensions.

Figure 37. GLRI Ranking versus GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Ranking for top-10 Countries



Source: Whiteshield

Shared foundations, different sensitivities: both versions rely on the same methodological architecture. The Structural Sub-Index accounts for 33 percent of total weight, and the Traditional dimension within Cyclical Sub-Index accounts for 45 percent. Only 22 percent of the weighting differs across the two indices. This ensures that both capture the common foundations of labour-market resilience while revealing distinct sensitivities to technological and trade-related disruption.

A broadly consistent group of leaders, with important exceptions: the global leaders in overall labour resilience appear prominently in both indices. Economies such as Germany, Singapore and Sweden perform strongly across both technological and trade disruptions due to diversified economic structures, strong innovation ecosystems and robust institutional capacity.

However, some countries, most notably the United States show significant divergence between technological and trade resilience.

Some countries, including the United States, show a pronounced divergence between technological resilience and trade resilience (Figure 38). The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test highlights a group of economies, such as Belgium, Netherlands, Kuwait, Tunisia, the Philippines, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa that are better positioned to withstand trade shocks than AI-driven disruption. Their resilience to trade fragmentation reflects economic structures anchored in domestic demand, services, or diversified regional markets, trade liberalisation which limit exposure to global value-chain volatility. At the same time, gaps in digital infrastructure, innovation diffusion, including AI and AI-related skills continue to constrain their preparedness for technology-driven labour-market change.

Figure 38. Rank Difference between GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test and GLRI 2026 for the Selected Countries



Source: Whiteshield

In contrast, countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Brazil, India, Korea and, as it was mentioned before, USA demonstrate stronger readiness for AI-related transformation than for trade-related shocks. These economies benefit from more advanced AI-related digital capabilities, deeper pools of technical talent, or rapidly expanding AI ecosystems. However, they remain vulnerable to global trade disruptions due to concentrated trade profiles, dependence on critical imported inputs, adverse trade policies and structural exposure to geopolitical tensions and supply-chain bottlenecks. This imbalance illustrates how technological strength does not automatically translate into trade resilience, and how different development pathways can reinforce one dimension of resilience while leaving another exposed.

The United Stated under Dual Disruption

The United States demonstrates strong AI resilience. The United States ranks among the global leaders in AI-related resilience, supported by world-class innovation capacity, rapid adoption of new technologies and a dynamic ecosystem of firms and skills systems. These strengths underpin strong adaptive and transformative capacity in the AI dimension (Figure 39).

Still, the United States struggles from weak trade resilience. In the trade dimension, the U.S. ranks 21st in GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test. Moderate import diversification, recurring tariff disputes and exposure to policy-driven volatility weaken its ability to cushion trade shocks. Trade-policy uncertainty also contributes to fluctuations in manufacturing employment and investment.

Figure 39. United States Pillar Ranks in the AI and Trade Dimensions of the GLRI and GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

The United States shows the resilience paradox. The United States demonstrates that technological dynamism does not automatically translate into trade resilience. Strengthening diversification and reducing policy-driven volatility would help reinforce labour-market stability.

Korea under Dual Disruption

Korea Excels in AI Absorptive Capacity but Faces Constraints in Trade Resilience. Korea stands out as one of the strongest performers in the GLRI and is the global leader in AI absorptive capacity. This position reflects several structural advantages: advanced firm-level digital adoption, a highly adaptable workforce and sustained national investment in AI infrastructure, research and innovation. These conditions enable Korea to adjust rapidly to technological change and place it among the most resilient economies in the AI dimension of the index (Figure 40).

In contrast, Korea's resilience to trade-related disruption is more limited. Its trade absorptive capacity is weakened by narrow export diversification, reliance on critical imported components, and exposure to geopolitical and militarisation-related risks. These factors amplify vulnerability to external shocks and constrain Korea's ability to cushion disruptions arising from global supply-chain fragmentation.

Korea's adaptive capacity exhibits relatively modest variation between the GLRI 2026 and Trade Fragmentation Stress Test versions of the GLRI. While the country benefits from strong innovation ecosystems and competitive technology-intensive industries, regulatory gaps in AI governance, a relatively high incidence of trade-distorting policies and restrictions in services trade reduce overall adjustment speed across both domains.

Korea remains one of the stronger performers in AI transformative capacity, supported by a robust digital infrastructure, extensive R&D activity and active intellectual-property generation. Yet in the trade context, its transformative capacity is more constrained. Limited regional and global trade integration reduces the extent to which Korea can leverage its technological strengths to build long-term resilience to trade fragmentation.

Figure 40. Korea Pillar Ranks in the AI and Trade Dimensions of the GLRI and GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

The Netherlands under Dual Disruption

The Netherlands Shows Strong Trade Resilience but More Moderate AI Capacity. The Netherlands displays a distinct profile of resilience across the AI and trade dimensions of the GLRI. Unlike economies such as the US and Korea, where AI resilience significantly exceeds trade resilience, the Netherlands moves in the opposite direction. According to the GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test, it ranks among the top performers globally in trade resilience, reflecting deep integration into global markets, efficient infrastructure and a strong capacity to manage external shocks. Its AI-related performance remains solid but comparatively lower, illustrating a structural asymmetry in the country's resilience strengths (Figure 41).

Figure 41. Netherlands Pillar Ranks in the AI and Trade Dimensions of the GLRI and GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

Absorptive capacity shows the sharpest contrast across the two versions of the index. In the AI dimension, the Netherlands demonstrates more modest worker adoption of AI technologies, which limits its ability to fully absorb rapid technological shifts. In the trade dimension, however, it performs exceptionally well. High diversification of exports and imports, combined with low exposure to military or conflict-related risks, strengthens its capacity to withstand trade disruptions.

In adaptive capacity, the Netherlands performs strongly in the AI dimension. This is supported by a dynamic innovation system, active digital entrepreneurship and sustained investment in technological transformation. Conversely, its adaptive capacity under trade disruption is moderated by a large share of employment in trade-intensive sectors and a relatively high incidence of trade-distorting policies, both of which constrain flexibility during external shocks.

The pattern shifts again in transformative capacity. The Netherlands performs better in the trade dimension than in AI. While its AI-related transformative capacity is limited by relatively modest research output and weaker intellectual-property generation, it excels in trade transformation due to highly efficient customs systems, world-class logistics infrastructure and deep global trade integration. These strengths position the Netherlands as one of the most effective economies at converting trade opportunities into long-term competitiveness.



CONCLUSION: A NEW ARCHITECTURE OF LABOUR RESILIENCE

The GLRI 2026 shows that labour resilience has entered a structural era. The efficiency-based globalisation of the past that was anchored in scale, specialisation and deep interdependence, has been replaced by a fragmented environment marked by technological rivalry, trade realignment, climate transition and demographic pressure. In this new order, resilience, diversification and adaptability are no longer complementary attributes; they are the central determinants of economic strength.

Three core messages are highlighted in this edition:

1. Diversification is the first line of defence

Economies with broad export portfolios, multi-regional trade networks and balanced sectoral structures demonstrate stronger absorptive capacity. Diversification spreads risk, cushions labour markets from sector-specific shocks and accelerates recovery.

The evidence is clear: the composition of trade, not its volume, determines resilience. Countries that rely heavily on a narrow set of partners or critical inputs are more vulnerable to disruption and experience sharper employment volatility.

Policy directions

- Pursue multi-market diversification across both goods and services.
- Reduce critical input dependencies, especially in energy, semiconductors and advanced manufacturing.
- Strengthen regional value-chain integration to build redundancy and flexibility.
- Invest in domestic logistics and customs capabilities to support reorientation during shocks.

2. Agility outweighs scale

The GLRI shows that structural adaptability, reflected in institutional agility, regulatory responsiveness and workforce mobility, now outweighs traditional measures such as GDP size or industrial mass. Smaller, nimble economies consistently demonstrate the ability to redeploy workers, shift production and recalibrate policy more quickly than larger, slower-moving systems. Adaptive capacity depends on the speed of adjustment, not the size of the economy.

Policy directions

- Build agile policy institutions capable of rapid response and iterative regulation.
- Expand lifelong learning and reskilling systems, especially in digital and AI skills.

- Strengthen labour-matching mechanisms to accelerate worker redeployment across sectors.

- Support entrepreneurial ecosystems that speed up innovation diffusion.

3. Transformation is the new competitiveness

The most resilient economies are not those that resist disruption, but those that transform disruption into renewed competitiveness. Their advantage lies in the ability to convert inputs, whether imported components, technologies or human capital, into higher-value outputs.

Transformation, rather than insulation, drives long-term labour resilience. This GLRI confirms that economies with strong innovation systems, logistics ecosystems and digital infrastructure achieve higher value-conversion efficiency and can reposition themselves as global conditions shift.

Policy directions

- Prioritise innovation capacity in both firms and institutions.

- Scale digitalisation of production, logistics and public services.

- Strengthen intellectual-property generation and technology absorption.

- Promote high-value export upgrading, especially in advanced services and knowledge-intensive industries.

Redefining Resilience for the Next Decade

Taken together, these insights redefine what it means to be resilient.

Resilience is no longer a passive capacity to withstand shocks; it is an active capability to absorb, adapt and transform in an environment where disruptions are persistent, overlapping and increasingly systemic.

- **Absorptive capacity** now rests on diversification, fiscal prudence and reduced structural exposure.

- **Adaptive capacity** depends on institutional responsiveness, human-capital agility and regulatory coherence.

- **Transformative capacity** is grounded in innovation, digitalisation, infrastructural effectiveness and the ability to convert disruption into long-term competitiveness.

The GLRI 2026 therefore marks a shift from viewing resilience as a defensive shield to understanding it as a strategic asset that determines economic opportunity, labour stability and competitiveness in a fractured global economy.

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

APPENDIX A: GLRI 2026 METHODOLOGY

The GLRI encompasses both fundamental and disruption-focused aspects of resilience. GLRI 2026 is a hierarchical composite index that distinguishes between two key components of resilience - Structural and Cyclical - each represented by its respective sub-index (Figure 42).

The **Structural sub-index** focuses on the fundamental, long-lasting characteristics that underpin a country's overall capacity for labour resilience. These factors tend not to change quickly and include the depth and maturity of the economy, the stability of its institutions, its demographic makeup, and the degree to which it is exposed or vulnerable to global trade. In essence, the Structural sub-index captures the enduring, baseline conditions that shape a country's ability to handle labour market challenges over time.

The **Cyclical sub-index** measures how effectively a country's labour market can respond to disruptions - both immediate shocks and longer-term changes driven by evolving technologies like AI. The Cyclical sub-index therefore reflects both near-term responsiveness and the longer-term adaptability required to navigate the full "disruption cycle".

Figure 42: Framework for the Global Labour Resilience Index 2026



Source: Whiteshield

The GLRI 2026 Structure

Capturing structural resilience

The Structural Sub-Index includes fundamental factors which cannot be quickly changed and are captured by the following pillars (Figure 43):

- **Demographics:** an ageing population reduces the availability of a sufficient labour supply and diminishes the population's capacity to reskill.

- **Economic development & macroeconomic stability**: determines the overall resilience of an economy. It captures three main topics affecting longer-term resilience: economic development, macroeconomic stability and inequality. Economically stable, richer, resource-independent countries with a large share of services in GDP and lower levels of inequality have the resources to develop and adopt new higher value-added technologies and are not reliant on resource extraction. The citizens of these countries have more equal opportunities to access education, health, training and quality jobs.

- **Trade vulnerability**: determines the resilience of the whole economy and labour market, namely to trade shocks. A more diversified economy with a diversified labour structure is less affected by cyclical changes, changing trade patterns, de-industrialization trends and external shocks in general.

- **Institutional capacity:** good governance and strong statistical capacity enhance labour resilience by enabling more effective policies, fair labour practices, and data-driven responses to workforce challenges, fostering improved adaptability and stability.

Figure 43: Composition of the Structural sub-Index



Source: Whiteshield

These pillars reflect potential inherent vulnerabilities which can either amplify or mitigate the impact of short- and long-term disruptions. All the pillars in the Structural sub-Index have the equal weight, except of Demographics pillar, which is half-weighted. Each structural pillar is calculated as the simple average of its topics, and each topic is the simple average of its indicators.

Capturing cyclical resilience

The Cyclical sub-Index measures dynamic responses of labour market performance to a shock or disruption across the stages of the "disruption cycle" (Figure 44). When a shock or disruption first hits the labour market, **Absorption capacities** determine its robustness and the extent of the downturn. **Adaptive capacities** explain the recovery phase, while **Transformative capacities** describe how well the labour market can transform itself to enhance its performance after the recovery stage is complete. All these disruption stages are captured by the corresponding pillars included to the Cyclical sub-index.

Figure 44: Framework for Cyclical resilience



Source: Whiteshield

The GLRI framework has been further reinforced with new AI indicators. The Global Labour Resilience Index (GLRI) has been expanded this year to address the growing significance of AI-driven disruptions in the labour market. The Index has been further adapted to account for countries' resilience to the challenges and opportunities posed by AI. This enhanced focus enables a more comprehensive evaluation of how well nations are prepared for the transformative impact of AI on jobs and the workforce in both the shorter and longer term.

GLRI allows to explicitly estimate the effect of AI on labour resilience. Cyclical resilience in the GLRI is now analysed through two dimensions: **Traditional and AI**. These dimensions assess a country's ability to absorb AI disruption, adapt to it, and transform the labour market in response to new environments.

- The **AI dimension** concentrates solely on AI-specific factors, including AI adoption by workers and firms, AI-driven entrepreneurship and employment, as well as AI-related R&D and innovation.

- The **Traditional dimension** encompasses non-AI-specific factors that contribute to resilience against future AI-driven disruptions, such as labour protection policies, workforce participation, education and skills, business environment, R&D and innovation, and ICT infrastructure.

The two dimensions are estimated separately, enabling a clear analysis of AI-specific effects on labour resilience. The Traditional dimension accounts for a weight of 2/3 while the AI dimension accounts for a weight of 1/3 in the ranking results, reflecting findings from the latest Slack Workforce Index survey on the recent AI usage among desk workers, equal to 36% globally and 33% in US [20]. The Traditional dimension accounts for the remaining 2/3, providing a balanced view of resilience factors.

GLRI investigates the resilience to disruptions from the perspective of policies and outcomes of these policies. Within both the Traditional and AI dimensions, the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities pillars are evaluated from two perspectives: **policy actions t**argeting relevant factors, categorized as **Inputs sub-pillars**, and the **outcomes** resulting from these policies, categorized as **Outputs sub-pillars.**

It is important to note that within each of the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities, the Inputs and Outputs of the AI and Traditional dimensions are interconnected. For instance, Traditional adaptive Inputs such as education, training and the business environment influence not only traditional entrepreneurship and employment but also contribute to AI-specific entrepreneurship and penetration.

The multi-layered structure of the Index hierarchy ensures the consistency between conceptual importance of factors and their weights in GLRI. Inputs and Outputs sub-pillars include **topics** capturing different aspects of the corresponding Inputs and Outputs. These topics are further divided into **categories,** which, in turn, include specific **indicators.** This multi-layered structure of the Index hierarchy ensures equal contribution of conceptually equally important factors, preventing any single factor from dominating the others and excluding redundancy. The top part of the cyclical sub-Index hierarchy is illustrated on Figure 45.

Figure 45: Constructing the Cyclical sub-Index – Decomposition from the Sub-Index to the Topic Level



Source: Whiteshield

The Cyclical sub-Index features a more complex hierarchy than the Structural sub-Index. As previously noted, it comprises the AI and Traditional dimensions, weighted at 1/3 and 2/3, respectively. Each dimension is calculated as the simple average of the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative pillars. These pillars are further divided equally into Inputs and Outputs sub-pillars (except for the AI absorptive capacity pillar, which includes only Outputs sub-pillar). Each sub-pillar is the simple average of its topics, each topic is the simple average of its categories, and each category is the simple average of its indicators.

Capturing the disruption cycle stages

1. Absorption Capacity

Absorptive capacities are defined as the ability of an economy to contain the AI disruption and minimise the damage on jobs and workers. Both Traditional and AI Absorptive capacities are divided into two groups based on policy Inputs and Outputs. The full structure of the Traditional and AI Absorptive capacity is illustrated in Figure 46.

- **Traditional Absorptive Inputs** capture the policies affecting the labour protection: inclusiveness, basic labour protection and efficiency of labour policy. Performance in these topics allows countries to reduce AI-driven job displacement by offering security for job transitions, shielding against unfair job losses, and supporting reskilling. Inclusiveness ensures equitable absorption, protecting women from disproportionate impacts.

- **Traditional Absorptive Outputs** capture the outcomes of labour protection policies: confidence in future, labour participation and youth participation – which drive resilience through higher participation and flexibility of workers.

- **AI Absorptive Outputs** reflect the firms and people adoption of AI. If both firms and workers anticipate a positive impact from AI, they are more likely to embrace its adoption, making it easier to absorb its effects while fostering greater willingness to reskill and adapt.

- **AI Absorptive Inputs** are not reflected in the GLRI as there is still not well-defined indication of policies affecting the level of firms and people adoption of AI.

Figure 46: Composition of the Traditional and AI Absorptive Capacity



Source: Whiteshield

2. Adaptive Capacity

Adaptive capacity is defined as the ability to recover quickly and rapidly create new jobs to replace the destroyed ones. Both Traditional and AI Adaptive capacities are divided into two groups based on policy Inputs and Outputs. The full structure of the Traditional and AI Adaptive Capacity is illustrated in Figure 47:

Figure 47: Composition of the Traditional and AI Adaptive Capacity



Source: Whiteshield

- **Traditional Adaptive Inputs** encompass educational and training policies, along with measures influencing the business environment. These policies directly enhance the ability of firms and individuals to adapt to the AI era by equipping them with necessary skills and fostering favourable conditions for entrepreneurship.

- **Traditional Adaptive Outputs** reflect the outcomes of corresponding adaptive Inputs, including the labour force's skillset including digital, levels of entrepreneurship, and the integration of new job types into the labour market. Together, these elements highlight the labour market's current adaptation capacity to AI disruption.

- **AI Adaptive Inputs** are represented by existing AI regulations, which demonstrate policy efforts to address AI's impact on the labour market. These efforts can enhance the market's preparedness for AI disruptions.

- **AI Adaptive Outputs** are reflective of Traditional Adaptive Outputs and reflect current AI entrepreneurship, investment, and the degree of AI integration into labour markets. This includes metrics such as the number of AI specialists and demand for AI skills in job postings. These factors capture the extent of AI's presence in labour markets - the greater the penetration, the more the workforce has already adapted through ongoing reskilling, reducing the expected disruption.

3. Transformative Capacity

Transformative capacity is defined as the ability to align with major future trends and turn long-term stresses into opportunities. As in previous pillars, both Traditional and AI Transformative capacities are divided into Inputs and Outputs. The full structure is illustrated on Figure 48.

Figure 48: Composition of the Traditional and AI Transformative Capacity



Source: Whiteshield

- **Traditional Transformative Inputs** encompass policies that drive innovation, such as those related to cybersecurity, ICT infrastructure, and R&D. These drivers of ICT innovation are essential for transforming economies and labour markets to align with the demands of the AI era.

- **Traditional Transformative Outputs** represent the results of innovation policies, including tangible innovation in a country, as demonstrated by IP patents and publications. They also capture the prevalence of innovation in production and exports, reflecting the further transformation within the country.

- **AI Transformative Inputs** consist of AI-specific policies aimed at fostering AI innovation and driving transformation. These include national AI strategies, AI equipment capacity, and dedicated AI R&D efforts.

- **AI Transformative Outputs** represent the outcomes of AI innovation, as evidenced by AI-related publications and IP. These Outputs indicates the promises for further transformation driven by AI advancements.

Methodological Notes

The GLRI is a composite indicator, derived through a weighted aggregation of indicators in a hierarchical structure. This approach allows the Index to be calculated as the weighted average of the scored indicators it comprises.

Indicators' selection

The indicators were carefully selected and calibrated to ensure both the comprehensiveness of labour resilience assessment and the high quality of indicators based on the criteria used. The selection process adhered to specific criteria, resulting in the inclusion of only 72 indicators out of over 150 initially considered:

- **Conceptual consistency.** Indicators must align with the definitions of their corresponding categories, topics, sub-pillars, and pillars. Their definitions should be exhaustive in capturing the essence of the associated category and topic.

- **Data comparability.** All data should be standardized to ensure comparability across countries, providing a fair representation of economic differences. For example, indicators are expressed relative to factors such as GDP (e.g. % of GDP) or population (per 1 million people). For indicators presented in absolute terms in official sources (i.e., total values not adjusted for country size), additional calculations were applied using scaling factors such as GDP (PPP) and population size.

- **Good data coverage**: Indicators should be available for at least 50% of all countries in the ranking. In the final set of indicators, over 50% have coverage for more than 90% of the ranked countries, while nearly 90% of indicators cover over 70% of countries-[1].

- **Sophisticated and internationally recognized data sources.** Most data are sourced from reputable international organizations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, ILO, OECD, UNCTAD, and ITU-[2].

- **Statistical coherence**. Across all levels of the Index hierarchy in the Structural sub-pillar-[3] and all levels of the Index hierarchy below the AI-Traditional dimensions in the Cyclical sub-Index, factors are equally divided into conceptually significant components. Multiple layers of the Index hierarchy ensure that no single conceptually equal factor dominates over others.

- **Indicators, topics and sub-pillars coherence.** Indicators were mapped to ensure they are not contradictory in terms of correlations to their respective topics and sub-pillars. The indicator mapping was also done considering the inter-indicator correlation. It was also checked that each topic should be more correlated with their own sub-pillar and pillar rather than others-[4]

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[1] Despite limited coverage, four indicators were included due to their conceptual importance and the absence of suitable alternatives. These indicators are: Statutory gross monthly minimum wage (coverage 48%), Sharing economy Index (coverage 41%), AI labour demand (coverage 35%) and Robot density (coverage 48%).

[2] For innovative AI indicators new data sources, which were never used in the previous versions of GLRI, e.g. Emerging Technology Observatory, Lloyd's Register Foundation, Tortoise and Customer Choice Center, were rigorously evaluated for internal and cross-source consistency, global relevance, and alignment with other indicators.

- **Effectiveness of data treatment**. The indicators which distribution couldn't be effectively adjusted by treatment steps described below, were excluded from the Index.

Indicators' treatment

Indicators having a skewed distribution and/or displaying outliers, meaning that some countries present exceptionally high or low values compared to others, could distort GLRI. In other words, some countries would be rewarded disproportionately in the composite indicator, irrespective of other dimensions. As the intention is not to reward exceptional achievements but to assess the average of a subset of indicators, in some cases data is adjusted before applying the normalization.

These cases are detected based on two criteria:

- Skewness higher than 2.25 or lower than -2.25
- Kurtosis higher than 4

If at least one of the two conditions above is met, extreme values are capped at the 95th (5th) percentile of the distribution for positive (negative) skewness.

However, some indicators may exhibit highly skewed distributions, making the winsorisation described above insufficient to bring their skewness or kurtosis within the specified ranges. In such cases, a logarithmic transformation is applied using the formula ln(x+1) where x represents each indicator value. In certain instances, both logarithmic transformation and winsorisation are applied as part of the indicator treatment process.

[3] Except Demography Pillar
[4] One minor acceptable exclusion is Economic development topic

Normalisation

Normalisation aims to convert the indicators into a common measurement scale so that they can be compared. In GLRI, indicators are rescaled to have the same lower (0) and upper (100) levels as follows:

- Indicators with the positive linkage with labour resilience are rescaled using the following formula:

$$\hat{X}_i = 100 \cdot \frac{X_i - min\,(x)}{max\,(x) - min\,(x)}$$

E.g.: workers' rights, tertiary education expenditure per student.

Where $\hat{X}_i$ and X_i are the rescaled and original values of the indicator X for country i, respectively, and min(x) and max(x) are the minimum and maximum values of X across all countries.

- Indicators with the negative linkage with labour resilience are rescaled using the following formula:

$$\hat{X}_i = 100 \cdot \frac{max\,(x) - X_i}{max\,(x) - min\,(x)}$$

E.g.: share of the older population, youth unemployment.

Data limitations

GLRI is a global Index. As such, it aims to include all countries around the world. However, the number of countries may vary from year to year, depending on data availability:

- If data are missing for more than 50% of the indicators, a country is excluded from the GLRI.

- There are also thresholds to the number of topics fully missing in the sub-pillar. If a country has the count of fully missing topics in the sub-pillar exceeding the threshold – this country is excluded from the ranking-[5] .

As a result of this data requirements, in GLRI 2026 the country sample size includes 120 countries from a potential of 234. No data imputation methods are employed in the case of missing data in which case they are referred to as "n.a.".

GLRI uses the latest data available at the time of the year when it is updated. Only indicators with data after 2021 were used. Exceptions were made for the worker's rights and resolving insolvency indicators.

[5] Exclusions from this rule are Dominican Republic, Bhutan, Ecuador, Senegal and Barbados

APPENDIX B:
GLRI TRADE FRAGMENTATION STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY

The Trade Fragmentation Stress Test follows the same methodological framework as the GLRI 2026, including identical approaches to data collection, processing, normalization, and weighting across indicators, categories, topics, pillars, and sub-indexes.

The only methodological difference lies in the substitution of the AI dimension (in GLRI 2026) with the Trade dimension (in Trade Fragmentation Stress Test).

As in the GLRI, the Trade dimension of Trade Fragmentation Stress Test is structured around three core capacities - absorptive, adaptive, and transformative. Each capacity is divided into inputs and outputs, which are further broken down into topics, categories, and finally indicators. The hierarchical structure of the Trade dimension is illustrated in the figure below (Figure 49).

Figure 49: Composition of the Trade Dimension in GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test



Source: Whiteshield

Capturing the disruption cycle stages in trade dimension

Trade absorptive capacity inputs capture a country's export concentration and supply-chain diversity, reflected by the extent to which its exports and imports are spread across different trade partners. These diversification indicators are taken from the Global Trade Resilience Index (GTRI) 2025, which export and import diversity are evaluated across 97 product networks. Higher diversification signals stronger policy efforts to reduce vulnerability and dependence on any single major trade partner.

Trade absorptive capacity outputs measure the results of these diversification efforts, expressed as the robustness of a country's position within global trade networks - specifically, its vulnerability to disruptions involving major partners or key routes. This indicator also comes from GTRI 2025. In addition, the output dimension incorporates broader internal and external risk factors, captured through the Global Peace Index, as well as vulnerabilities arising from a country's production structure. Economies heavily dependent on imports of critical raw materials but not converting them into high-value outputs remain highly exposed to external shocks.

Trade adaptive capacity inputs reflect the policy environment governing trade, particularly the presence of trade-distorting or protectionist measures, which signal structural weakness in a country's ability to adapt without resorting to restrictive tools. Given the growing importance of services in global trade, the openness of services trade is also included as part of the adaptive input assessment.

Trade adaptive capacity outputs measure the labour market's ability to adjust to trade shocks. The key indicator is the share of employment embodied in trade. A high share increases exposure, as trade contractions have a larger and faster impact on jobs, making labour market adjustment more difficult. On the other hand, workers in trade-related sectors often enjoy a positive wage premium, which provides some financial buffer during temporary downturns.

Trade transformative capacity inputs capture long-term trade integration efforts, such as the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) a country participates in, as well as customs-related policies aimed at improving procedural efficiency.

Trade transformative capacity outputs reflect the actual operational performance of a country's trade system - namely, the efficiency of customs procedures, and the quality of logistics and infrastructure that enable goods to move smoothly across borders.

APPENDIX C:
GLRI 2026 COMPONENTS RESULTS TABLES

Table 3. GLRI 2026 Structural Sub-index by Country and Pillar

Country	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-1 00)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Netherlands	1	85.86	99	33.04	3	90.07	7	98.40	6	95.53
Denmark	2	85.06	104	31.72	6	86.56	12	95.29	1	100.00
Austria	3	83.03	101	32.64	9	84.47	4	99.22	14	90.59
USA	4	81.25	86	42.17	24	79.64	11	96.54	18	87.12
Germany	5	81.22	115	23.43	11	84.19	10	97.44	12	90.91
Belgium	6	81.19	100	32.82	5	87.43	14	94.40	25	85.93
Luxembourg	7	80.84	74	50.90	2	90.12	37	74.11	9	93.28
France	8	80.82	111	27.16	14	83.12	5	99.13	19	87.05
Sweden	9	80.74	102	32.14	12	83.49	23	87.09	4	95.95
UK	10	78.55	92	36.58	16	82.04	19	88.19	21	86.39
Poland	11	78.49	96	34.29	28	75.50	1	100.00	31	82.08
Spain	12	78.03	106	30.73	27	75.69	9	97.92	27	84.11
Czechia	13	77.51	103	31.79	18	82.00	22	87.45	24	85.95
Finland	14	76.98	116	20.93	8	84.68	31	75.90	2	98.39
Canada	15	76.68	93	35.51	19	81.22	30	75.94	8	93.48
Italy	16	76.33	119	18.35	26	75.80	2	99.83	30	82.33
Singapore	17	76.21	68	57.37	1	91.39	69	54.56	11	92.09
Estonia	18	76.18	107	30.18	33	71.81	15	89.40	15	90.32
Portugal	19	76.01	118	18.68	34	71.56	6	98.98	22	86.14
Switzerland	20	74.78	95	34.73	4	88.19	56	61.27	7	94.91
Lithuania	21	74.76	97	34.21	40	69.57	18	88.93	23	86.05
Romania	22	74.24	94	34.87	36	70.86	26	83.43	17	88.12
India	23	73.94	41	80.53	39	69.85	13	94.51	73	54.17
Korea	24	73.83	91	37.39	23	79.69	35	74.27	26	85.76
Japan	25	73.33	120	0.00	17	82.04	25	84.65	16	89.98
New Zealand	26	73.32	82	44.78	25	77.72	57	60.94	5	95.56
Latvia	27	72.74	108	28.62	41	69.07	21	87.76	28	83.46
Israel	28	72.23	66	61.30	30	74.74	39	72.21	39	75.19
UAE	29	72.09	2	99.68	29	74.80	61	58.97	45	68.71
Croatia	30	71.31	114	23.46	31	74.35	17	89.09	41	74.43
Slovenia	31	70.46	109	28.49	13	83.40	55	62.31	20	86.67
Ireland	32	69.85	77	49.42	10	84.22	85	44.91	13	90.64
Hungary	33	69.47	105	31.27	32	72.19	28	78.31	36	77.02
Thailand	34	69.16	73	51.30	43	68.30	20	87.92	58	60.19
Slovakia	35	68.88	88	40.00	22	80.60	53	63.24	34	77.23
Turkey	36	68.73	60	69.37	97	47.56	3	99.62	60	58.69
Bulgaria	37	68.04	110	27.58	49	64.21	16	89.39	43	70.76
Norway	38	67.31	89	39.12	21	80.63	97	38.47	3	96.94
Indonesia	39	67.02	42	80.03	66	58.74	38	73.82	56	62.00
China	40	66.81	72	53.78	38	70.29	8	98.39	103	38.26
Egypt	41	66.49	29	87.76	80	54.37	27	83.35	82	51.10

Country	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-1 00)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Australia	42	66.38	84	42.88	35	71.35	83	46.83	10	92.72
Malaysia	43	66.21	44	78.43	53	62.32	54	62.66	46	67.54
Mexico	44	65.61	49	76.61	64	58.95	45	68.25	49	64.14
Iceland	45	65.26	76	50.30	7	85.39	101	34.50	29	83.39
Mauritius	46	65.10	67	57.84	48	64.37	50	64.64	44	69.92
Serbia	47	64.84	113	25.24	46	65.57	24	85.15	52	63.60
Jordan	48	64.81	27	89.87	54	62.30	59	60.55	59	59.04
Greece	49	64.66	117	20.78	37	70.39	44	69.79	38	75.74
Cyprus	50	64.40	71	53.96	20	80.72	95	40.48	35	77.21
Tunisia	51	63.76	56	72.06	60	60.88	33	74.62	80	51.64
Philippines	52	63.65	31	86.42	57	61.98	68	55.06	55	62.51
Costa Rica	53	62.65	63	62.46	71	56.95	73	53.35	32	77.76
Dominican Republic	54	62.26	45	77.93	62	59.23	52	63.49	70	56.21
Guatemala	55	62.25	28	88.71	85	53.38	34	74.46	90	45.67
Malta	56	62.03	98	34.05	15	82.97	88	43.20	42	73.90
Kenya	57	61.89	9	95.41	84	53.40	43	69.94	92	45.56
Vietnam	58	61.44	53	73.77	68	57.89	40	71.25	85	49.00
Uruguay	59	61.41	78	48.87	51	63.37	77	50.80	37	76.32
El Salvador	60	60.98	47	76.97	78	55.39	46	67.35	78	52.23
South Africa	61	60.86	39	82.16	115	35.78	32	74.68	57	61.47
Moldova	62	60.62	79	48.28	50	63.75	60	60.31	50	63.96
Georgia	63	59.91	75	50.32	52	63.05	82	47.05	40	74.43
Senegal	64	59.58	19	93.09	90	50.87	71	54.03	67	57.10
Morocco	65	59.28	46	77.00	77	55.46	58	60.79	76	52.73
North Macedonia	66	58.58	87	41.83	56	62.05	67	56.09	47	65.99
Barbados	67	58.00	80	47.08	47	65.31	64	57.04	66	57.11
Chile	68	57.72	70	55.67	87	52.62	87	44.14	33	77.42
Belarus	69	57.68	83	43.10	45	65.99	41	70.82	97	43.52
Uzbekistan	70	57.58	34	85.10	92	49.29	63	58.13	81	51.57
Pakistan	71	57.54	25	90.73	83	53.47	48	66.94	106	35.61
Armenia	72	57.26	69	57.21	44	66.22	91	42.60	54	63.00
Sri Lanka	73	57.05	62	62.90	103	44.69	47	67.30	69	56.22
Brazil	74	57.04	61	66.65	101	45.48	51	63.50	65	57.32
Qatar	75	57.00	1	100.00	58	61.81	106	29.53	63	58.15
Colombia	76	56.75	58	71.17	102	45.24	72	53.53	48	64.28
B&H	77	56.35	112	26.87	59	61.41	29	77.56	93	44.82
Bhutan	78	56.12	35	82.86	42	68.73	105	32.08	72	54.17
Kyrgyzstan	79	55.97	33	85.75	70	57.53	79	49.86	91	45.65
Montenegro	80	55.39	85	42.51	55	62.07	76	52.08	61	58.44
Peru	81	55.17	54	73.13	89	51.11	75	52.33	75	53.09
Saudi Arabia	82	54.69	8	95.46	65	58.76	113	21.26	51	63.68
Togo	83	54.57	14	94.53	94	48.32	66	56.55	102	38.85
Ukraine	84	54.48	90	38.49	74	56.05	49	64.67	83	50.71
Argentina	85	54.19	65	61.79	98	46.83	70	54.51	64	57.43

Country	Structural Rank	Structural Score (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-100)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Honduras	86	53.59	26	90.24	95	48.25	65	56.82	104	37.39
Paraguay	87	53.49	37	82.70	91	50.78	89	43.15	79	51.93
Myanmar	88	52.81	43	79.97	61	59.66	62	58.60	112	26.57
Uganda	89	52.77	3	98.18	107	43.61	81	47.97	94	44.05
Kuwait	90	52.40	12	94.92	82	54.29	100	34.91	87	46.72
Benin	91	52.10	13	94.87	76	55.73	104	33.01	88	46.16
Kazakhstan	92	51.86	52	75.17	63	59.09	107	28.47	68	56.34
Lebanon	93	51.70	59	69.89	96	47.69	36	74.25	115	24.09
Panama	94	51.20	55	72.68	73	56.10	103	33.60	74	53.14
Bahrain	95	51.13	23	92.25	79	55.23	94	40.63	105	36.95
Brunei	96	50.87	40	81.53	81	54.31	111	24.75	62	58.21
Rwanda	97	50.84	24	91.99	112	39.54	99	36.32	71	56.07
Mongolia	98	50.76	30	87.68	105	44.27	109	26.31	53	63.24
Bangladesh	99	50.47	36	82.84	69	57.71	98	36.69	99	40.81
Ecuador	100	50.41	50	76.27	100	46.03	96	39.97	77	52.30
Namibia	101	50.37	20	92.89	116	35.39	80	48.78	89	45.67
Oman	102	50.29	6	96.55	110	42.40	92	41.35	95	44.00
Bolivia	103	50.26	32	85.89	106	43.83	84	45.72	98	43.41
Russia	104	50.07	81	44.84	86	52.63	74	52.50	86	47.71
Trinidad & Tobago	105	48.56	64	61.92	67	58.06	93	41.08	100	39.86
Iran	106	48.07	48	76.65	118	33.65	42	70.30	113	25.98
Madagascar	107	47.40	17	93.85	108	43.50	78	50.04	114	25.44
Ethiopia	108	46.80	16	94.47	104	44.51	90	42.86	110	29.20
Mauritania	109	46.65	15	94.48	75	55.93	110	25.52	108	34.60
Ghana	110	46.52	21	92.77	119	32.74	102	33.62	84	50.06
Tajikistan	111	44.63	22	92.26	93	49.05	86	44.44	117	16.58
Algeria	112	44.63	38	82.54	72	56.12	112	24.17	107	34.63
Azerbaijan	113	41.92	51	75.52	88	52.61	114	17.08	101	39.26
Burkina Faso	114	39.99	7	96.53	114	36.98	116	11.21	96	43.53
Burundi	115	37.25	5	96.95	111	41.09	108	27.37	118	13.43
Nigeria	116	36.76	11	95.12	109	42.96	118	8.91	109	29.22
Mali	117	35.84	4	97.48	113	38.59	117	10.25	111	27.86
Iraq	118	32.15	18	93.81	99	46.81	120	0.00	116	18.80
Congo	119	29.46	10	95.34	120	26.97	115	15.25	119	13.24
Venezuela	120	22.47	57	71.52	117	33.98	119	8.90	120	0.00

Source: Whiteshield

Table 4. GLRI 2026 Cyclical Traditional Dimension by Country and Pillar

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
UK	1	74.49	20	70.06	1	78.44	6	74.96
Korea	2	74.42	8	75.72	22	58.65	1	88.90
Singapore	3	74.27	16	72.27	7	71.98	3	78.58
USA	4	73.45	19	70.13	2	73.91	4	76.32
Switzerland	5	72.93	2	79.74	11	66.92	10	72.11
Sweden	6	72.77	15	72.49	6	71.99	8	73.82
Israel	7	71.55	21	70.02	19	61.82	2	82.81
Germany	8	71.15	3	78.37	20	61.50	9	73.58
Iceland	9	70.87	1	83.42	9	70.04	21	59.16
Australia	10	69.89	13	73.32	5	72.87	17	63.49
Finland	11	69.76	12	73.71	12	65.13	11	70.44
Netherlands	12	69.32	6	76.49	16	62.62	13	68.84
New Zealand	13	68.92	4	77.45	3	73.84	31	55.46
Canada	14	68.62	10	74.50	10	68.22	18	63.15
China	15	67.07	35	63.78	15	62.96	7	74.49
Denmark	16	66.70	11	73.76	24	56.88	12	69.45
Norway	17	66.53	7	76.42	13	64.03	22	59.13
France	18	66.18	24	68.14	14	63.40	14	67.00
Belgium	19	65.88	22	68.85	17	62.12	15	66.67
Estonia	20	64.89	26	66.63	4	73.77	35	54.28
Ireland	21	64.28	9	74.52	18	61.97	29	56.36
Luxembourg	22	64.26	17	72.06	8	71.47	41	49.26
Austria	23	63.99	5	76.97	42	49.43	16	65.59
Japan	24	63.36	14	72.50	65	42.07	5	75.50
Czechia	25	60.58	23	68.53	37	52.31	20	60.90
Bahrain	26	58.31	33	64.94	39	51.46	23	58.52
Portugal	27	58.01	37	63.31	25	56.29	34	54.44
Malaysia	28	57.52	50	58.41	26	56.15	26	58.01
Poland	29	56.33	30	65.34	48	47.26	28	56.38
Slovenia	30	55.99	25	68.14	54	45.18	33	54.63
Spain	31	55.93	43	62.71	40	51.04	36	54.03
Lithuania	32	55.89	27	66.14	27	54.32	47	47.21
UAE	33	55.75	69	51.82	21	59.91	30	55.51
Cyprus	34	54.75	29	65.41	30	54.17	51	44.66
Malta	35	54.64	41	62.99	29	54.25	49	46.68
Russia	36	54.28	38	63.27	36	52.50	48	47.06
Slovakia	37	54.26	32	65.00	43	48.80	43	48.99
Hungary	38	54.21	44	62.21	49	47.25	38	53.18
Latvia	39	54.21	31	65.00	32	53.16	53	44.46
Italy	40	54.16	53	56.27	46	47.71	24	58.50
Thailand	41	51.89	36	63.50	75	38.20	37	53.97

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
Croatia	42	51.43	42	62.96	47	47.43	54	43.89
Qatar	43	51.19	46	60.82	35	52.52	65	40.22
Vietnam	44	50.26	40	63.00	93	30.95	27	56.82
Bulgaria	45	49.51	49	59.80	51	46.13	56	42.61
Oman	46	49.45	52	57.90	31	53.21	72	37.23
Belarus	47	49.42	18	71.12	66	42.07	80	35.06
Barbados	48	48.75	51	58.18	52	46.08	60	42.00
Romania	49	48.59	59	55.11	45	48.29	57	42.37
Kazakhstan	50	48.57	34	64.02	55	45.00	75	36.67
Serbia	51	47.94	68	52.06	50	46.41	50	45.34
Chile	52	47.86	63	53.71	33	53.09	73	36.79
Moldova	53	47.29	28	66.11	58	44.11	84	31.64
Brazil	54	47.07	75	49.83	64	42.21	42	49.16
Saudi Arabia	55	47.04	86	46.46	28	54.28	64	40.39
Montenegro	56	46.87	70	51.57	23	58.21	86	30.83
Georgia	57	46.62	71	51.14	38	51.97	74	36.75
Brunei	58	46.08	57	55.33	34	52.82	92	30.08
Philippines	59	46.06	60	54.16	70	39.41	52	44.62
Uruguay	60	45.80	47	60.65	87	35.71	62	41.05
Azerbaijan	61	45.71	39	63.14	60	43.46	88	30.53
Greece	62	44.93	90	45.42	79	36.90	39	52.46
Ukraine	63	44.30	76	49.80	63	42.37	63	40.73
Morocco	64	43.69	117	25.30	61	43.21	19	62.57
Mauritius	65	43.63	74	49.91	41	50.42	87	30.57
Turkey	66	43.55	87	46.27	90	33.22	40	51.15
North Macedonia	67	43.45	82	48.48	53	45.52	76	36.36
Mexico	68	43.23	66	52.80	89	33.22	55	43.69
Costa Rica	69	42.46	73	50.88	68	40.96	77	35.54
Kyrgyzstan	70	42.27	48	60.26	74	38.32	96	28.24
Armenia	71	42.24	79	48.98	57	44.29	81	33.44
Indonesia	72	42.19	72	51.06	86	35.78	67	39.74
India	73	41.94	108	34.03	85	36.34	32	55.45
Jordan	74	41.62	116	27.60	71	39.17	25	58.09
Colombia	75	41.40	83	48.08	56	44.51	85	31.60
Peru	76	41.30	62	53.93	69	39.49	89	30.48
Algeria	77	41.20	98	40.22	67	41.15	59	42.22
Kuwait	78	40.97	84	47.16	59	43.57	83	32.19
Argentina	79	40.92	64	53.45	80	36.90	82	32.42
South Africa	80	40.87	105	38.11	62	42.98	61	41.51
Ghana	81	40.67	88	46.12	99	28.15	45	47.74
Ecuador	82	40.65	78	49.03	106	25.50	46	47.40
Mongolia	83	40.45	65	53.44	73	38.84	95	29.08
Trinidad & Tobago	84	40.12	56	55.33	76	38.01	98	27.01
Uzbekistan	85	39.80	67	52.48	81	36.90	93	30.04

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
Panama	86	39.33	55	55.50	92	32.91	94	29.57
Kenya	87	37.91	89	46.02	78	37.60	90	30.12
Tunisia	88	37.08	109	33.25	77	37.87	66	40.11
Benin	89	36.74	91	45.18	102	27.66	71	37.38
Bolivia	90	36.11	45	61.73	97	28.61	111	17.99
Paraguay	91	35.87	61	54.05	104	26.24	97	27.32
Egypt	92	35.50	115	28.89	72	39.00	70	38.61
B&H	93	34.87	92	45.08	88	34.48	100	25.05
Sri Lanka	94	34.76	106	37.56	82	36.60	91	30.12
Bangladesh	95	34.40	107	36.54	118	17.74	44	48.92
Dominican Republic	96	34.21	77	49.80	94	30.62	103	22.22
Bhutan	97	34.14	102	39.27	111	20.92	58	42.23
Lebanon	98	34.06	112	32.08	44	48.50	105	21.61
Rwanda	99	33.71	101	39.40	84	36.36	99	25.38
Nigeria	100	33.66	58	55.15	112	20.82	101	25.02
Senegal	101	33.63	110	32.93	96	29.11	69	38.87
Iran	102	32.85	113	31.22	98	28.21	68	39.13
Namibia	103	32.14	94	43.58	91	33.06	107	19.78
Ethiopia	104	31.54	96	41.81	117	17.74	79	35.06
El Salvador	105	30.57	85	46.65	103	26.36	108	18.71
Pakistan	106	30.40	114	29.88	105	25.91	78	35.41
Venezuela	107	30.14	54	55.55	113	20.50	114	14.36
Myanmar	108	29.28	95	43.38	109	22.31	104	22.16
Uganda	109	29.08	80	48.54	114	20.08	109	18.63
Madagascar	110	28.46	81	48.53	100	28.01	118	8.85
Togo	111	27.78	103	39.05	107	24.26	106	20.03
Honduras	112	26.80	97	41.27	108	24.00	113	15.14
Burundi	113	26.56	93	44.82	95	30.42	120	4.43
Guatemala	114	26.34	100	39.56	110	21.25	110	18.22
Tajikistan	115	24.01	104	38.57	101	27.96	119	5.52
Mauritania	116	23.26	119	22.75	83	36.38	117	10.66
Burkina Faso	117	23.16	111	32.78	115	19.92	112	16.79
Mali	118	22.72	99	39.63	120	15.89	115	12.64
Iraq	119	21.46	120	20.64	116	19.42	102	24.32
Congo	120	17.72	118	24.70	119	17.34	116	11.11

Source: Whiteshield

Table 5. GLRI 2026 Cyclical AI Dimension by Country and Pillar

Country	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity AI Rank	Absorptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity AI Rank	Adaptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity AI Rank	Transformative Capacity AI Score (0-100)
Korea	1	79.91	1	100.00	21	58.98	3	80.75
China	2	79.26	3	86.80	13	63.91	2	87.08
USA	3	78.77	25	55.99	1	87.73	1	92.57
Singapore	4	76.96	10	78.23	2	76.75	4	75.90
Germany	5	76.22	5	82.82	4	76.43	8	69.41
Finland	6	70.51	7	80.33	6	76.19	16	55.01
Luxembourg	7	68.09	4	84.92	11	65.54	17	53.80
UK	8	67.96	31	53.59	3	76.49	6	73.80
Japan	9	67.87	2	88.80	32	48.12	11	66.69
Canada	10	67.59	26	55.75	7	75.57	7	71.46
Sweden	11	63.97	9	79.87	8	72.72	26	39.31
Switzerland	12	62.94	12	69.68	16	61.80	13	57.34
UAE	13	62.68	8	79.90	27	51.66	14	56.48
Israel	14	62.61	43	50.74	5	76.39	12	60.71
France	15	61.25	44	50.65	12	65.21	10	67.87
Australia	16	60.58	40	51.01	15	62.78	9	67.96
Denmark	17	59.58	11	74.92	17	61.66	25	42.17
Netherlands	18	57.83	15	64.18	18	61.60	20	47.72
Spain	19	55.61	16	63.62	24	54.86	19	48.35
Italy	20	53.51	22	58.49	20	59.14	22	42.89
Saudi Arabia	21	53.28	14	68.38	30	49.01	24	42.44
Norway	22	51.09	45	50.25	10	66.09	30	36.93
Estonia	23	50.75	20	59.34	14	62.98	47	29.91
Ireland	24	49.86	32	53.21	22	58.25	28	38.13
Austria	25	49.52	23	56.09	25	53.90	27	38.57
India	26	49.08	79	30.64	9	68.94	21	47.67
Slovenia	27	48.52	17	63.16	29	50.11	39	32.29
Qatar	28	48.44	6	82.68	56	32.89	48	29.77
Cyprus	29	47.33	53	38.96	34	47.53	15	55.49
Belgium	30	47.15	36	52.34	23	55.06	36	34.04
Iceland	31	45.96	28	54.91	31	48.91	35	34.07
Portugal	32	45.06	59	37.22	19	61.42	31	36.55
Czechia	33	42.80	30	54.04	36	43.76	44	30.60
Brunei	34	42.55					23	42.55
Malta	35	42.42	57	37.45	26	52.82	29	36.99
New Zealand	36	41.91	49	44.63	28	50.76	46	30.33
Bahrain	37	41.08	18	62.73	35	45.39	91	15.12
Oman	38	39.92	13	69.22	59	31.36	78	19.18
Hungary	39	38.95	33	53.14	42	38.11	54	25.60
Lebanon	40	38.08	97	25.97	100	12.66	5	75.59
Namibia	41	37.66	78	30.86	57	32.67	18	49.43

Country	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity AI Rank	Absorptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity AI Rank	Adaptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity AI Rank	Transformative Capacity AI Score (0-100)
Malaysia	42	36.91	55	38.19	37	40.90	40	31.65
Lithuania	43	36.09	60	36.86	33	47.76	62	23.65
Poland	44	36.03	52	39.21	39	40.32	49	28.55
Slovakia	45	35.36	34	52.58	45	36.96	84	16.54
Uruguay	46	34.33	48	45.14	38	40.62	83	17.23
Bhutan	47	34.22					34	34.22
Brazil	48	34.18	81	30.46	44	37.64	33	34.44
Russia	49	34.13	61	36.42	60	31.17	32	34.80
Jordan	50	34.05	39	51.34	88	20.08	43	30.74
Vietnam	51	33.78	38	51.57	76	25.95	61	23.81
Montenegro	52	33.78	50	43.30	47	35.37	66	22.66
Turkey	53	33.65	80	30.60	41	39.90	45	30.44
Mali	54	33.58	29	54.57	77	25.52	73	20.64
Rwanda	55	33.42	21	58.73	65	28.44	101	13.09
Thailand	56	32.80	35	52.47	83	21.64	59	24.29
Greece	57	32.27	58	37.36	73	26.72	38	32.74
Chile	58	31.13	76	30.99	43	38.08	58	24.31
Azerbaijan	59	31.06	19	61.79	84	21.38	109	10.02
Uzbekistan	60	31.03	42	50.99	72	27.09	93	15.01
Kuwait	61	30.80	75	31.89	40	40.17	75	20.35
Bulgaria	62	30.46	62	36.31	51	33.79	69	21.29
Mexico	63	30.22	64	36.03	52	33.50	70	21.14
Romania	64	30.00	77	30.99	50	33.91	55	25.10
Mauritius	65	29.51	41	50.99	80	23.30	97	14.24
Costa Rica	66	29.50	46	49.23	58	31.88	116	7.38
Latvia	67	29.18	56	37.65	48	34.73	90	15.17
Argentina	68	29.03	74	32.18	46	36.08	79	18.82
Ukraine	69	28.58	65	35.51	67	28.00	67	22.23
Myanmar	70	28.36	51	41.00			88	15.72
Bangladesh	71	28.12	47	48.82	94	14.85	72	20.69
Iraq	72	27.92	27	55.27	108	7.45	71	21.03
Pakistan	73	27.80	63	36.23	81	22.94	60	24.21
Benin	74	27.74	24	56.01	92	17.40	110	9.82
Colombia	75	27.73	66	35.02	68	27.68	74	20.50
Indonesia	76	27.65	96	26.34	61	29.64	52	26.97
Burundi	77	27.14	112	15.24	54	33.24	37	32.94
Armenia	78	27.12	70	33.82	55	33.13	96	14.40
Togo	79	27.01	87	29.26			56	24.76
Georgia	80	26.86	69	33.83	64	28.90	82	17.85
Iran	81	26.75	54	38.58	104	10.68	42	31.01
Barbados	82	26.61			53	33.40	76	19.83
Croatia	83	26.19	98	25.93	49	34.04	80	18.59
Tunisia	84	26.14	67	34.74	87	20.21	63	23.46

Country	Cyclical AI Rank	Cyclical AI Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity AI Rank	Absorptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity AI Rank	Adaptive Capacity AI Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity AI Rank	Transformative Capacity AI Score (0-100)
Senegal	85	25.54	72	33.19	62	28.99	95	14.43
Morocco	86	24.25	73	32.39	91	18.20	68	22.17
Guatemala	87	23.99	37	52.30	102	11.13	113	8.54
South Africa	88	23.93	99	25.40	66	28.17	81	18.22
Egypt	89	23.83	108	19.44	63	28.95	64	23.10
Serbia	90	23.60	100	25.25	85	21.14	57	24.40
Kazakhstan	91	23.51	89	28.69	70	27.62	98	14.21
Ecuador	92	23.48	86	29.27	98	13.37	51	27.79
Kyrgyzstan	93	23.08	88	29.03	71	27.62	103	12.59
Nigeria	94	22.60	84	29.65	82	22.24	87	15.90
Philippines	95	22.58	92	27.16	74	26.60	99	13.97
Congo	96	22.22	82	29.78	86	20.65	85	16.24
North Macedonia	97	22.08	110	15.59	90	19.51	41	31.14
Sri Lanka	98	21.95	83	29.77	78	24.75	106	11.34
Kenya	99	21.27	85	29.48	69	27.64	117	6.71
Ghana	100	21.08	71	33.72	97	13.60	86	15.91
Peru	101	20.78	103	23.86	79	23.36	92	15.11
Algeria	102	20.25	68	34.30	103	10.81	89	15.63
Panama	103	19.98	91	27.36	75	26.44	118	6.16
Uganda	104	18.83	105	21.62	101	12.16	65	22.72
B&H	105	18.62	114	13.47	95	14.45	50	27.95
Mongolia	106	18.04	104	22.73	89	19.61	105	11.77
Dominican Republic	107	17.44	95	26.57	93	15.03	107	10.71
Tajikistan	108	17.06	90	28.46	96	13.65	112	9.06
Belarus	109	16.19			110	5.90	53	26.48
El Salvador	110	16.10	93	26.84	99	13.33	114	8.13
Moldova	111	15.60	94	26.77			120	4.43
Venezuela	112	14.74	101	24.11	114	0.66	77	19.44
Ethiopia	113	13.87	102	23.93	109	7.05	108	10.63
Paraguay	114	12.51	111	15.27	105	9.98	104	12.29
Madagascar	115	12.32	106	20.82	112	1.32	94	14.82
Bolivia	116	12.04	107	19.60	111	3.40	100	13.12
Trinidad & Tobago	117	11.00			106	9.29	102	12.72
Honduras	118	10.87	113	14.07	107	9.24	111	9.30
Burkina Faso	119	8.65	109	17.50	115	0.37	115	8.08
Mauritania	120	2.87			113	1.10	119	4.64

Source: Whiteshield

APPENDIX D:
GLRI TRADE FRAGMENTATION STRESS TEST COMPONENTS RESULTS TABLES

Table 6. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Structural Sub-index by Country and Pillar

Country	Structural Rank	Structural (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-100)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Netherlands	1	85.97	99	98.40	6	95.53	33.04	2	90.47	7
Denmark	2	85.22	104	95.29	1	100.00	31.72	6	87.13	12
Austria	3	83.19	101	99.22	14	90.59	32.64	9	85.02	4
Germany	4	81.36	115	97.44	12	90.91	23.43	11	84.70	10
Belgium	5	81.34	100	94.40	25	85.93	32.82	5	87.94	14
USA	6	81.30	86	96.54	18	87.12	42.17	24	79.80	11
France	7	80.97	111	99.13	19	87.05	27.16	14	83.64	5
Sweden	8	80.88	102	87.09	4	95.95	32.14	13	83.97	23
Luxembourg	9	80.84	76	74.11	9	93.28	50.90	3	90.12	37
Poland	10	78.79	96	100.00	31	82.08	34.29	27	76.54	1
UK	11	78.67	92	88.19	21	86.39	36.58	18	82.49	19
Spain	12	78.26	106	97.92	27	84.11	30.73	28	76.51	9
Czechia	13	77.75	103	87.45	24	85.95	31.79	16	82.82	22
Finland	14	77.16	116	75.90	2	98.39	20.93	8	85.29	31
Canada	15	76.83	93	75.94	8	93.48	35.51	19	81.74	30
Italy	16	76.61	119	99.83	30	82.33	18.35	26	76.79	2
Estonia	17	76.44	107	89.40	15	90.32	30.18	33	72.72	15
Singapore	18	76.35	70	54.56	11	92.09	57.37	1	91.87	68
Portugal	19	76.26	118	98.98	22	86.14	18.68	34	72.45	6
Lithuania	20	75.01	97	88.93	23	86.05	34.21	40	70.46	18
Switzerland	21	74.86	95	61.27	7	94.91	34.73	4	88.47	57
Romania	22	74.58	94	83.43	17	88.12	34.87	35	72.04	26
India	23	74.37	44	94.51	72	54.17	80.53	38	71.36	13
Korea	24	74.07	91	74.27	26	85.76	37.39	23	80.52	35
New Zealand	25	73.56	84	60.94	5	95.56	44.78	25	78.56	58
Japan	26	73.51	120	84.65	16	89.98	0.00	17	82.65	25
Latvia	27	73.06	108	87.76	28	83.46	28.62	41	70.16	21
Israel	28	72.41	68	72.21	39	75.19	61.30	31	75.39	39
UAE	29	72.41	2	58.97	45	68.71	99.68	29	75.92	61
Croatia	30	71.62	114	89.09	41	74.43	23.46	30	75.43	17
Slovenia	31	70.75	109	62.31	20	86.67	28.49	12	84.39	56
Ireland	32	70.08	79	44.91	13	90.64	49.42	10	85.00	83
Hungary	33	69.82	105	78.31	36	77.02	31.27	32	73.39	28
Thailand	34	69.48	75	87.92	58	60.19	51.30	43	69.42	20
Turkey	35	69.19	63	99.62	60	58.69	69.37	95	49.16	3
Slovakia	36	69.16	88	63.24	34	77.23	40.00	21	81.59	53
Bulgaria	37	68.36	110	89.39	43	70.76	27.58	49	65.33	16
Norway	38	67.59	89	38.47	3	96.94	39.12	20	81.61	94
Indonesia	39	67.50	45	80.03	62	60.42	38	73.82	56	62.00
China	40	67.09	74	53.78	39	71.28	8	98.39	103	38.26

Country	Structural Rank	Structural (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-100)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Egypt	41	67.07	31	87.76	78	56.40	27	83.35	82	51.10
Malaysia	42	66.57	46	78.43	54	63.57	55	62.66	46	67.54
Australia	43	66.57	85	42.88	36	71.99	81	46.83	10	92.72
Mexico	44	65.97	52	76.61	63	60.19	44	68.25	50	64.14
Iceland	45	65.54	78	50.30	7	86.35	100	34.50	29	83.39
Mauritius	46	65.45	69	57.84	48	65.61	50	64.64	44	69.92
Serbia	47	65.24	113	25.24	45	66.97	24	85.15	52	63.60
Jordan	48	65.24	28	89.87	52	63.80	60	60.55	59	59.04
Greece	49	64.97	117	20.78	37	71.46	43	69.79	38	75.74
Cyprus	50	64.57	73	53.96	22	81.33	92	40.48	35	77.21
Tunisia	51	64.24	59	72.06	58	62.56	33	74.62	80	51.64
Philippines	52	63.95	33	86.42	57	63.06	67	55.06	55	62.51
Costa Rica	53	63.01	66	62.46	69	58.18	74	53.35	32	77.76
Albania	54	62.72	82	45.75	47	65.72	48	64.94	47	66.00
Dominican Republic	55	62.68	47	77.93	60	60.73	52	63.49	68	56.21
Guatemala	56	62.64	30	88.71	83	54.75	34	74.46	91	45.67
Kenya	57	62.42	10	95.41	82	55.26	42	69.94	93	45.56
Malta	58	62.13	98	34.05	15	83.33	86	43.20	42	73.90
Vietnam	59	61.98	56	73.77	65	59.78	40	71.25	85	49.00
Uruguay	60	61.71	80	48.87	50	64.44	77	50.80	37	76.32
El Salvador	61	61.47	49	76.97	76	57.07	45	67.35	78	52.23
South Africa	62	61.27	43	82.16	114	37.21	32	74.68	57	61.47
Georgia	63	60.30	77	50.32	51	64.42	80	47.05	40	74.43
Senegal	64	60.16	19	93.09	87	52.88	70	54.03	65	57.10
Morocco	65	59.72	48	77.00	77	57.00	59	60.79	75	52.73
North Macedonia	66	59.04	87	41.83	53	63.65	66	56.09	48	65.99
Barbados	67	58.32	81	47.08	46	66.43	63	57.04	64	57.11
Uzbekistan	68	58.13	36	85.10	91	51.21	62	58.13	81	51.57
Pakistan	69	58.12	26	90.73	81	55.51	47	66.94	107	35.61
Chile	70	58.06	72	55.67	86	53.82	85	44.14	33	77.42
Nepal	71	57.81	40	82.82	70	58.02	54	62.87	101	40.03
Armenia	72	57.69	71	57.21	44	67.71	89	42.60	54	63.00
Sri Lanka	73	57.62	65	62.90	102	46.68	46	67.30	67	56.22
Brazil	74	57.45	64	66.65	101	46.93	51	63.50	63	57.32
Qatar	75	57.38	1	100.00	55	63.16	106	29.53	61	58.15
Colombia	76	57.13	61	71.17	103	46.58	73	53.53	49	64.28
B&H	77	56.84	112	26.87	56	63.11	29	77.56	95	44.82
Kyrgyzstan	78	56.51	35	85.75	67	59.39	78	49.86	92	45.65
Bhutan	79	56.43	38	82.86	42	69.82	105	32.08	71	54.17
Peru	80	55.59	57	73.13	88	52.59	76	52.33	74	53.09
Saudi Arabia	81	55.27	9	95.46	59	60.76	110	21.26	51	63.68
Ukraine	82	55.01	90	38.49	71	57.91	49	64.67	83	50.71

Country	Structural Rank	Structural (0-100)	Demographics Rank	Demographics Score (0-100)	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Rank	Economic development and macroeconomic stability Score (0-100)	Trade vulnerability Rank	Trade vulnerability Score (0-100)	Institutional capacity Rank	Institutional capacity Score (0-100)
Argentina	83	54.94	67	61.79	94	49.47	69	54.51	62	57.43
Tanzania	84	54.81	11	95.13	109	44.60	72	53.55	89	46.13
Honduras	85	54.05	27	90.24	93	49.85	64	56.82	104	37.39
Paraguay	86	53.97	41	82.70	89	52.48	87	43.15	79	51.93
Jamaica	87	53.17	50	76.75	75	57.16	95	38.28	77	52.28
Côte d'Ivoire	88	53.01	5	96.68	79	56.33	98	35.44	94	45.42
Kuwait	89	52.87	14	94.92	80	55.94	99	34.91	87	46.72
Benin	90	52.64	15	94.87	72	57.62	103	33.01	88	46.16
Lebanon	91	52.38	62	69.89	92	50.04	36	74.25	115	24.09
Kazakhstan	92	52.24	55	75.17	61	60.44	107	28.47	66	56.34
Cambodia	93	52.10	37	84.03	99	47.22	65	56.25	106	36.89
Bahrain	94	52.04	23	92.25	68	58.43	91	40.63	105	36.95
Panama	95	51.51	58	72.68	74	57.21	102	33.60	73	53.14
Rwanda	96	51.46	24	91.99	111	41.73	97	36.32	69	56.07
Mongolia	97	51.38	32	87.68	104	46.43	108	26.31	53	63.24
Oman	98	51.06	6	96.55	108	45.07	90	41.35	96	44.00
Bangladesh	99	51.00	39	82.84	66	59.56	96	36.69	99	40.81
Ecuador	100	50.96	53	76.27	97	47.94	93	39.97	76	52.30
Bolivia	101	50.88	34	85.89	106	45.99	82	45.72	98	43.41
Namibia	102	50.87	20	92.89	115	37.15	79	48.78	90	45.67
Russia	103	50.64	83	44.84	84	54.61	75	52.50	86	47.71
Laos	104	49.71	29	89.36	110	41.81	71	53.88	109	33.62
Iran	105	48.36	51	76.65	118	34.68	41	70.30	113	25.98
Ethiopia	106	47.52	16	94.47	100	47.01	88	42.86	111	29.20
Ghana	107	47.17	21	92.77	117	35.04	101	33.62	84	50.06
Tajikistan	108	45.32	22	92.26	90	51.49	84	44.44	119	16.58
Algeria	109	44.95	42	82.54	73	57.25	109	24.17	108	34.63
Cameroon	110	43.57	8	96.02	105	46.21	104	32.34	114	25.94
Botswana	111	43.27	25	91.60	98	47.73	118	3.58	70	54.34
Azerbaijan	112	42.45	54	75.52	85	54.49	113	17.08	102	39.26
Guinea	113	41.19	18	93.67	64	59.83	112	18.32	117	19.19
Burkina Faso	114	40.69	7	96.53	113	39.40	114	11.21	97	43.53
Zambia	115	40.11	3	99.04	120	29.65	111	20.91	100	40.30
Nigeria	116	37.38	12	95.12	107	45.14	116	8.91	110	29.22
Mali	117	36.58	4	97.48	112	41.18	115	10.25	112	27.86
Iraq	118	32.77	17	93.81	96	49.00	120	0.00	118	18.80
Congo DR	119	30.39	13	95.02	119	32.32	119	3.18	116	23.35
Venezuela	120	23.26	60	71.52	116	36.76	117	8.90	120	0.00

Source: Whiteshield

Table 7. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Cyclical Traditional Dimension by Country and Pillar

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
Singapore	1	77.21	15	73.74	6	72.91	3	84.98
UK	2	76.09	19	71.19	1	79.42	7	77.66
USA	3	75.95	18	71.42	2	74.92	4	81.49
Korea	4	75.44	8	77.41	22	59.58	1	89.33
Switzerland	5	74.82	2	80.89	11	68.02	10	75.54
Sweden	6	74.60	14	73.74	7	72.89	8	77.18
Israel	7	73.65	20	71.15	19	62.83	2	86.97
Germany	8	73.52	3	79.65	20	62.27	6	78.63
Iceland	9	72.67	1	84.84	9	70.95	22	62.22
Australia	10	71.99	13	74.64	5	73.81	18	67.53
Finland	11	71.94	12	75.02	12	65.88	11	74.93
Netherlands	12	71.29	6	77.71	15	63.59	13	72.57
Canada	13	70.82	11	75.06	10	69.10	17	68.29
New Zealand	14	70.68	7	77.46	3	74.71	28	59.88
Norway	15	68.56	5	77.75	13	64.85	21	63.10
Denmark	16	68.47	10	75.07	23	57.74	12	72.61
France	17	68.04	24	69.32	14	64.04	14	70.76
China	18	67.88	39	63.84	16	63.17	9	76.64
Belgium	19	67.80	22	70.13	17	63.16	15	70.10
Luxembourg	20	66.71	17	73.24	8	72.60	40	54.28
Estonia	21	66.23	25	68.02	4	74.62	36	56.05
Austria	22	65.79	4	78.11	40	49.85	16	69.41
Ireland	23	65.62	9	75.71	18	62.95	31	58.21
Japan	24	65.20	16	73.63	60	43.03	5	78.93
Czechia	25	61.94	23	69.72	36	52.85	20	63.25
Portugal	26	59.65	34	64.61	24	56.91	34	57.43
Bahrain	27	59.44	31	65.36	37	52.26	25	60.69
Malaysia	28	58.69	50	58.42	25	56.54	24	61.11
Slovenia	29	57.98	21	70.29	53	45.86	33	57.78
Poland	30	57.93	27	66.83	45	48.01	29	58.96
UAE	31	57.55	69	52.25	21	61.93	30	58.46
Lithuania	32	57.30	26	67.43	26	55.41	46	49.04
Spain	33	57.10	40	63.76	38	51.68	37	55.86
Russia	34	56.15	33	64.68	34	53.59	44	50.18
Hungary	35	55.65	41	63.50	46	47.93	38	55.53
Cyprus	36	55.62	28	66.49	28	55.03	55	45.34
Italy	37	55.58	53	57.12	44	48.13	23	61.50
Malta	38	55.54	38	63.99	29	54.84	49	47.79
Slovakia	39	55.50	30	66.25	41	49.47	43	50.77
Latvia	40	55.50	29	66.46	30	53.99	53	46.04
Thailand	41	53.50	32	64.80	72	38.62	35	57.07
Qatar	42	52.48	46	61.24	32	53.74	63	42.46
Croatia	43	52.42	36	64.21	47	47.92	56	45.13

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
Vietnam	44	51.76	37	64.19	91	31.16	27	59.93
Bulgaria	45	50.58	47	61.11	49	46.80	58	43.83
Oman	46	50.47	51	58.04	31	53.98	75	39.37
Romania	47	49.57	56	56.37	43	48.67	61	43.68
Barbados	48	49.52	49	58.84	51	46.03	60	43.69
Kazakhstan	49	49.42	35	64.24	52	46.02	78	38.02
Chile	50	49.08	60	54.71	33	53.64	77	38.89
Serbia	51	49.06	66	53.33	48	46.88	50	46.96
Brazil	52	48.42	76	50.89	62	42.62	42	51.76
Georgia	53	48.16	68	52.58	35	52.86	76	39.03
Saudi Arabia	54	48.06	86	46.80	27	55.11	64	42.26
Philippines	55	47.37	58	55.45	66	39.86	51	46.81
Uruguay	56	47.30	45	61.81	84	36.26	59	43.82
Greece	57	46.50	89	46.38	75	37.65	39	55.47
Azerbaijan	58	46.26	42	63.26	57	43.94	93	31.57
Jamaica	59	46.02	48	59.33	76	37.40	72	41.33
Ukraine	60	45.61	74	51.11	61	42.80	62	42.90
Turkey	61	44.78	87	46.77	87	33.74	41	53.83
Albania	62	44.75	70	52.11	82	36.46	54	45.67
Morocco	63	44.69	119	25.33	59	43.17	19	65.58
North Macedonia	64	44.57	79	50.24	50	46.34	83	37.14
Mexico	65	44.52	64	53.72	88	33.64	52	46.21
Mauritius	66	44.26	75	50.93	39	50.39	95	31.46
Costa Rica	67	43.55	73	51.66	63	41.50	82	37.49
Kyrgyzstan	68	43.48	44	62.52	71	38.93	100	28.98
Indonesia	69	43.18	71	51.99	85	35.98	69	41.58
Armenia	70	43.02	78	50.25	54	45.02	88	33.80
India	71	43.02	108	34.34	80	36.65	32	58.07
Jordan	72	42.59	118	27.97	67	39.69	26	60.11
South Africa	73	42.23	104	38.59	58	43.27	57	44.83
Colombia	74	42.16	81	48.90	55	44.92	90	32.64
Peru	75	41.96	61	54.71	69	39.46	91	31.71
Argentina	76	41.73	63	54.49	78	36.87	87	33.85
Mongolia	77	41.57	62	54.65	68	39.66	99	30.39
Kuwait	78	41.41	82	47.53	56	44.02	89	32.69
Ecuador	79	41.37	80	49.96	103	25.76	47	48.38
Algeria	80	41.34	98	40.35	64	41.46	66	42.20
Ghana	81	41.13	85	47.11	96	28.27	48	48.01
Botswana	82	40.64	93	42.94	79	36.83	68	42.16
Uzbekistan	83	40.51	67	52.68	77	37.35	94	31.49
Panama	84	40.27	55	56.63	89	33.31	98	30.88
Tanzania	85	39.25	65	53.41	105	23.98	73	40.37
Kenya	86	38.60	84	47.18	74	37.72	97	30.91

Country	Cyclical Traditional Rank	Cyclical Traditional Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Absorptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Rank	Adaptive Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Traditional Rank	Transformative Capacity Traditional Score (0-100)
Tunisia	87	38.07	109	33.83	73	38.17	65	42.20
Cameroon	88	37.72	92	43.89	65	40.78	102	28.49
Cambodia	89	37.15	57	56.07	107	23.73	92	31.66
Benin	90	37.15	88	46.74	98	27.74	84	36.97
Paraguay	91	36.84	59	55.06	99	26.56	101	28.91
Bolivia	92	36.78	43	62.76	94	29.01	113	18.58
Egypt	93	36.17	117	29.53	70	38.97	74	39.99
Sri Lanka	94	35.37	105	38.32	81	36.59	96	31.19
B&H	95	35.30	90	46.10	86	34.76	106	25.04
Zambia	96	35.08	102	39.85	106	23.89	71	41.51
Dominican Republic	97	34.85	77	50.80	92	31.08	109	22.67
Côte d'Ivoire	98	34.77	97	40.39	101	26.24	81	37.66
Bangladesh	99	34.66	106	36.72	117	17.89	45	49.35
Nigeria	100	34.41	54	56.70	114	20.82	105	25.71
Iran	101	34.38	113	32.05	95	28.91	67	42.16
Bhutan	102	34.25	101	40.09	111	21.11	70	41.56
Rwanda	103	34.23	99	40.35	83	36.45	104	25.88
Lebanon	104	33.52	112	32.79	42	49.00	112	18.77
Senegal	105	33.50	111	33.52	93	29.14	80	37.83
Laos	106	33.15	72	51.84	108	23.70	108	23.91
Namibia	107	32.56	91	44.91	90	33.27	110	19.49
Ethiopia	108	31.64	94	42.40	118	17.81	86	34.69
Venezuela	109	31.24	52	57.16	113	20.99	118	15.58
El Salvador	110	31.01	83	47.34	100	26.51	111	19.16
Pakistan	111	30.74	116	29.84	102	26.05	85	36.32
Nepal	112	30.56	115	30.57	109	23.10	79	38.01
Honduras	113	27.27	95	41.95	104	24.20	117	15.67
Guinea	114	27.11	114	32.03	112	20.99	103	28.30
Guatemala	115	26.66	96	40.39	110	21.27	114	18.31
Tajikistan	116	23.54	103	39.32	97	28.24	120	3.08
Burkina Faso	117	23.28	110	33.68	115	19.94	115	16.22
Mali	118	22.42	100	40.19	119	15.89	119	11.19
Iraq	119	21.90	120	21.11	116	19.76	107	24.82
Congo DR	120	20.10	107	35.89	120	8.68	116	15.73

Source: Whiteshield

Table 8. GLRI Trade Fragmentation Stress Test Cyclical Trade Dimension by Country and Pillar

Country	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Trade Rank	Absorptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Trade Rank	Adaptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Trade Rank	Transformative Capacity Trade Score (0-100)
Germany	1	82.73	1	96.65	22	63.16	6	88.39
Singapore	2	82.18	17	89.29	19	64.64	1	92.63
Qatar	3	81.42	26	87.32	2	97.90	49	59.04
Finland	4	80.55	11	90.27	29	59.81	2	91.57
Switzerland	5	80.50	9	90.53	20	63.88	8	87.09
Denmark	6	80.29	12	90.24	24	62.15	5	88.48
UAE	7	80.19	34	83.64	3	84.41	34	72.54
Japan	8	80.15	36	83.59	7	75.35	13	81.50
UK	9	80.02	8	90.64	10	69.99	16	79.43
Sweden	10	79.95	7	90.93	28	59.88	4	89.03
Netherlands	11	79.79	5	91.27	33	57.85	3	90.25
Norway	12	79.65	10	90.42	12	69.41	17	79.11
Lithuania	13	77.85	6	91.00	15	68.01	27	74.52
Spain	14	77.81	3	91.96	34	57.84	11	83.62
Estonia	15	77.53	4	91.76	21	63.50	21	77.32
France	16	76.96	14	89.71	38	57.09	10	84.10
Latvia	17	76.62	20	88.26	14	68.98	33	72.62
Cyprus	18	76.14	40	82.27	5	77.63	40	68.52
Belgium	19	75.76	15	89.57	52	49.37	7	88.34
Israel	20	75.58	60	74.73	4	78.49	30	73.51
USA	21	74.73	41	81.98	18	65.08	23	77.14
Italy	22	74.63	2	92.26	42	54.21	19	77.42
Australia	23	74.36	54	76.91	13	69.10	24	77.08
Austria	24	74.33	38	82.92	43	54.00	9	86.06
Morocco	25	74.31	35	83.61	6	77.17	46	62.14
New Zealand	26	74.28	33	84.06	16	66.08	32	72.71
Greece	27	74.22	29	85.69	30	59.62	20	77.33
Kuwait	28	73.91	55	76.61	1	100.00	72	45.11
Korea	29	73.25	59	75.21	23	63.15	14	81.38
Luxembourg	30	73.16	44	81.32	37	57.11	15	81.06
Croatia	31	72.22	16	89.41	44	53.55	29	73.70
Ireland	32	71.92	31	85.23	48	52.13	18	78.41
Portugal	33	71.69	32	84.78	41	55.11	25	75.17
Poland	34	70.51	28	85.77	54	48.46	22	77.31
Slovakia	35	69.67	21	88.16	50	51.24	37	69.62
Czechia	36	69.37	30	85.29	45	53.12	36	69.71
China	37	69.28	25	87.36	51	49.69	35	70.79
Turkey	38	67.46	48	78.70	32	57.92	43	65.77
Hungary	39	67.35	24	87.43	53	49.13	44	65.48
Chile	40	66.59	66	71.77	11	69.47	50	58.53

Country	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Trade Rank	Absorptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Trade Rank	Adaptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Trade Rank	Transformative Capacity Trade Score (0-100)
Romania	41	66.47	22	88.13	58	43.68	41	67.61
India	42	66.13	45	80.04	40	56.74	47	61.61
Tunisia	43	65.95	43	81.33			63	50.57
Iceland	44	65.65	37	83.21	60	40.79	31	72.95
Serbia	45	64.86	23	87.77			76	41.95
Oman	46	64.58	78	66.57			45	62.59
Malta	47	64.47	42	81.53	62	37.96	28	73.93
Slovenia	48	64.18	62	73.32	57	44.24	26	74.97
Uruguay	49	63.85	58	75.85			61	51.85
Malaysia	50	63.64	27	86.20	64	35.75	38	68.98
Canada	51	63.34	106	50.23	39	56.95	12	82.84
Saudi Arabia	52	62.93	57	76.06	35	57.33	52	55.41
Panama	53	62.45	75	67.56			51	57.34
Thailand	54	62.35	46	79.51	59	41.22	42	66.31
Philippines	55	62.24	71	70.16	25	61.68	56	54.88
B&H	56	62.13	39	82.89			78	41.36
Egypt	57	62.03	80	65.36	9	73.31	68	47.43
Costa Rica	58	61.38	72	69.83	26	60.30	58	54.00
Bahrain	59	60.98	70	70.62			62	51.33
Bulgaria	60	60.43	18	88.92	65	23.75	39	68.60
Peru	61	60.37	73	68.06	27	60.10	59	52.96
Kazakhstan	62	60.07	68	71.15	17	65.99	74	43.07
Colombia	63	60.01	79	66.31	31	58.62	53	55.09
Kenya	64	59.42	82	64.29			57	54.55
South Africa	65	59.38	47	79.21	36	57.24	77	41.69
Indonesia	66	58.76	51	78.11	55	46.17	60	52.01
Jordan	67	58.17	61	73.39			75	42.95
Vietnam	68	57.55	77	66.97	56	46.08	48	59.59
North Macedonia	69	56.52	83	64.09			65	48.96
Albania	70	56.20	64	72.63			81	39.77
Ecuador	71	55.98	81	65.07			70	46.89
Senegal	72	55.89	74	67.57			73	44.21
Ukraine	73	55.82	49	78.65	47	52.54	86	36.28
Nigeria	74	55.56	84	64.01	8	75.27	103	27.40
Pakistan	75	55.13	91	60.15			64	50.12
Bhutan	76	54.69	13	90.09			107	19.30
Brazil	77	54.40	67	71.38	63	36.82	55	54.99
Sri Lanka	78	54.29	56	76.54			92	32.03
Ghana	79	53.92	50	78.20			98	29.64
Côte d'Ivoire	80	53.81	53	77.07			94	30.55
Zambia	81	53.30	69	70.98			87	35.61
Argentina	82	53.28	92	59.73	49	52.06	66	48.05
Barbados	83	53.00	19	88.76			110	17.24
Azerbaijan	84	52.27	102	56.53			67	48.00

Country	Cyclical Trade Rank	Cyclical Trade Score (0-100)	Absorptive Capacity Trade Rank	Absorptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Adaptive Capacity Trade Rank	Adaptive Capacity Trade Score (0-100)	Transformative Capacity Trade Rank	Transformative Capacity Trade Score (0-100)
Guatemala	85	51.42	86	63.12			82	39.72
Tanzania	86	50.85	87	62.85			83	38.84
Mexico	87	49.89	111	41.83	46	52.77	54	55.07
El Salvador	88	49.25	99	57.21			79	41.30
Armenia	89	49.07	89	60.81			85	37.33
Republic	90	48.46	100	56.91			80	40.00
Bolivia	91	48.39	63	73.02			105	23.76
Lebanon	92	48.34	76	67.48			99	29.20
Cambodia	93	47.96	90	60.61			89	35.31
Georgia	94	47.77	108	48.63			69	46.92
Mauritius	95	47.77	52	77.98			109	17.57
Honduras	96	47.66	98	57.62			84	37.69
Jamaica	97	46.22	85	63.33			100	29.12
Uzbekistan	98	45.87	94	59.55			91	32.19
Paraguay	99	45.32	101	56.62			90	34.02
Benin	100	44.90	104	54.36			88	35.44
Namibia	101	44.59	88	62.53			104	26.66
Botswana	102	42.28	103	54.40			95	30.15
Guinea	103	41.81	65	72.31			116	11.31
Russia	104	41.73	114	38.88	61	40.15	71	46.15
Cameroon	105	40.39	93	59.58			106	21.20
Mali	106	35.72	97	57.87			112	13.57
Kyrgyzstan	107	35.67	112	41.26			96	30.08
Venezuela	108	35.52	96	57.88			113	13.16
Rwanda	109	35.36	105	53.14			108	17.58
Tajikistan	110	34.47	115	37.37			93	31.57
Laos	111	33.55	113	38.96			101	28.14
Ethiopia	112	30.16	95	58.20			120	2.13
Mongolia	113	29.07	117	28.26			97	29.87
Burkina Faso	114	28.75	107	49.34			119	8.16
Congo DR	115	28.74	109	45.80			115	11.67
Algeria	116	28.60	110	44.38			114	12.81
Bangladesh	117	25.92	118	23.93			102	27.91
Iran	118	23.27	116	36.42			117	10.13
Nepal	119	18.04	120	20.96			111	15.12
Iraq	120	15.87	119	22.88			118	8.85

Source: Whiteshield